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Case Notes
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-State Aid to Sectarian Education
-Child Benefit Theory-Board of Education v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228
N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967).
The New York legislature enacted a statute in 1965 requiring local boards of educa-
tion to purchase and loan textbooks to children in both public and private schools
which comply with the state's compulsory education law.1 Several local boards of
education and towns brought action against the Commissioner of Education to re-
strain him from appropriating funds under the statute to parochial schools. The
supreme court declared the statute unconstitutional in violation of both the New
York2 and federal8 constitutions, and enjoined defendant.4 The appellate division
1. [B]oards of education ... shall have the power and duty to purchase and to loan
upon individual request, to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in
grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies with the compul-
sory education law.., text-books which are designated for use in any public, elemen-
tary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education....
Such text-books are to be loaned free to such children subject to such rules and regula-
tions as are or may be prescribed by the board of regents and such boards of
education....
N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 701 (3) (McKinney Supp. 1967). See Note, 32 BROOKLYN L. REv. 362 (1966).
2. Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property or credit or any
public money, or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or indirectly, in aid or
maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of
learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomina-
tion, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught, but the legislature
may provide for the transportation of children to and from any school or institution of
learning.
N.Y. CONsT. art. 11, § 3 (formerly § 4; renumbered Jan. 1, 1963) (hereinafter referred to as
the Blaine Amendment).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. First applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 51 Misc. 2d 297, 273 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See 20
VAND. L. REv. 640 (1967), 31 ALBANY L. REv. 152 (1967).
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reversed and dismissed the complaint. 5 Three justices, constituting the majority, de-
cided the appeal solely on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have standing to
bring the action. Two justices concurred in the result but decided the appeal on the
merits, finding that plaintiffs possessed the requisite standing and that the textbook
law did not violate either constitution. The New York Court of Appeals, by a vote of
4 to 3, affirmed the appellate division's order of reversal, but held that plaintiffs did
have the requisite standing, and that the statute violated neither the Blaine Amend-
ment to the New York Constitution nor the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment, since its purpose is to aid school children and not the religious institutions.6
Until the first amendment was construed as applicable to the states, 7 state aid to
parochial school students had not been an issue arising under the federal constitu-
tion.8 The question thus first arose under various state constitutions.9 Defendants in
these cases developed the "child benefit" or "public function" theory, arguing that
no aid, or only indirect aid at most, was given to the institutions involved, since the
benefit went directly to the student as a public welfare measure.' 0 But most states in
which the issue has been adjudicated have rejected the theory."1 The Supreme Court,
however, in Everson v. Board of Education,12 accepted this line of reasoning to up-
hold a New Jersey bus transportation statute challenged as violative of the establish-
ment clause. On the other hand, the minority in that 5-4 decision rejected the theory
and felt the statute constituted direct aid to religious institutions.13
5. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 27 App. Div. 2d 69, 276 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1966).
6. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), ap-
peal filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3117 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1967) (No. 660).
7. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 3, at 303.
8. But the question of state aid to private school students arose in Cochran v. Board of
Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), where the Court upheld a Louisiana statute dispensing text-
books and other supplies to all school children. The issue, however, was only whether the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited the appropriation of public
funds for such a "private purpose." The Court held that there was a sufficient public pur-
pose. Id. at 375.
9. Some state constitutions are identical to the first amendment. Others, like New York's,
are more explicitly restrictive. A few are silent on the matter. For a listing of the various
provisions, see Note, 60 HARv. L. REV. 793, 794 (1947); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 917, 920 (1940).
10. The theory was first accepted in Borden v. Board of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 1020, 123 So.
655, 660 (1929), where a textbook statute was upheld under the Louisiana constitution.
Borden was a companion case to Cochran v. Board of Educ., supra note 8. A textbook stat-
ute was similarly upheld in Chance v. Mississippi Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 190
Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
11. See Matthew v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alas. 1961) (busing); Opinion of the Justices,
216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966) (busing); Sherrard v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469,
171 S.W.2d 963 (1942) (busing); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953)
(busing); Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963) (busing); Dickman v.
School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962) (textbooks);
Haas v. Independent School Dist., 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943) (textbooks); Visser v.
Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) (busing); State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Nussbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962) (busing).
In addition to New York, there are currently six states with statutes authorizing the loan
of textbooks to parochial school children: IND. STAT. ANN. § 28-512 (Burns 1948); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 72-4107 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-351 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6656
(1942); R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-23-2 (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-21 (b) (1966).
The Rhode Island statute was recently ruled unconstitutional under both the first amend-
ment and art. I, § 3 of the Rhode Island Constitution. Bowerman v. O'Connor, Equity No.
31775 (Providence County Super. Ct., Sept. 19, 1967), appeal filed, (Oct. 3, 1967).
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
13. Mhis approach, if valid, supplies a ready method for nullifying the [first] Amend-
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Cases and articles during the 20 years since Everson reveal ever-mounting criticism
of the soundness of Justice Black's reasoning in the majority opinion and support for
the logic of the dissents of Justices Rutledge and Jackson.14 To confuse matters fur-
ther, Justice Douglas, who voted with the majority in Everson, has changed his posi-
tion. In a concurring opinion in Engel v. Vitale,15 the New York Regents' prayer
case, he wrote:
My problem today would be uncomplicated but for Everson v. Board of
Education .... The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line with
the First Amendment. Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to
needy children. Yet by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy
other needs of children in parochial schools--lunches, books, and tuition be-
ing obvious examples. Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what I think is
durable First Amendment philosophy .... 16
Mr. Justice Douglas' candid remarks have led parties to attempt relitigation of the
Everson issue in the New Jersey courts and elsewhere,17 but so far the Supreme Court
has not been inclined to reconsider or clarify the issue. 18 Since Everson, the Court
has not applied the child benefit-public function theory, nor has it used any single
test to determine the validity of state legislation under the establishment clause.19
ment's guaranty, not only for this case and others involving small grants in aid for re-
ligious education, but equally for larger ones. The only thing needed will be for the
Court again to transplant the "public welfare-public function" view from its proper ...
bearing to First Amendment application, holding that religious education is not "sup-
ported" though it may be aided by the appropriation, and that the cause of education
generally is furthered by helping the pupil to secure that type of training.
Id. at 57 (dissent of Mr. Justice Rutledge).
14. See, e.g., La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation
and Medical Care, 13 J. PUB. L. 76 (1964); Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of the Wis-
consin School Bus Law, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 500; Pollack, W.B.R.: Some Reflections, 71 YALE
L.J. 1451 (1962).
15. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16. Id. at 443. See Pollack, supra note 14, at 1457:
Justice Douglas' conclusion that Everson was "out of line with the First Amendment"
means that, of the three [now two] sitting justices who were members of the Everson
Court, only Justice Black remains committed to its teaching. Moreover, Everson was a
five-to-four decision ... so that Justice Douglas' defection robs Everson of virtually
all its precedential impact. And this is of real consequence, because Everson is the chief
doctrinal reliance of those who argue that governmental appropriations in aid of
church-related schools are constitutional.
It must be noted, however, that none of the four dissenting justices any longer sit on the
court.
17. In Fox v. Board of Educ., 93 N.J. Super. 544, 226 A.2d 471 (1967), plaintiffs alleged
that Everson is not the currently prevailing law in view of later expressions of the Supreme
Court. The court reluctantly followed Everson, commenting: "If I were free to determine
this issue of constitutionality unfettered by the precedential effect of the direct holding
of the majority opinion in Everson, I would incline toward the dissent of Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge and his finding of unconstitutionality- ..." Id. at 577, 226 A.2d at 478. Still another
case has been filed in New Jersey. McCenna v. Sills, No. C-17-67 (N.J. Super. Ct., Bergen
County, Ch., filed Sept. 7, 1967).
18. Most recently, the Court denied certiorari in a Pennsylvania case upholding a busing
statute on the child benefit theory. Rhoades v. Abington Tp. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202, 226
A.2d 53, cert. denied, 36 U.S.L.W. 3145 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1967) (No. 110).
19. Compare Engel v. Vitale, supra note 15, with McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
[Vol. XVII
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Rather than attempting to cope with or even to discuss the uncertainty underly-
ing the area, the New York court in Allen rested squarely on the child benefit theory
and the Everson precedent to support its holding that there had been no violation of
the establishment clause.20 Furthermore, the court declined to follow its own prece-
dents which had rejected the child benefit theory and had stricken down similar leg-
islation as constituting indirect aid prohibited by the Blaine Amendment. 21 The ma-
jority relied heavily on the legislature's expression of intent to bestow a benefit on
all school children 22 and the fact that the texts in question were secular in nature,
since they were those used in the public schools. Finally, engaging in a bit of lin-
guistic gymnastics, the court rendered the word "indirect" meaningless, by holding
that the statute gave no indirect aid to parochial schools whatsoever: "Since there is
no intention to assist parochial schools as such, any benefit accruing to those schools
is a collateral effect of the statute, and, therefore, cannot be properly classified as
the giving of aid directly or indirectly."2 3 (Emphasis added.)
The reasoning of Allen reveals the shortcomings of the child benefit test. Certainly
any type of transportation or textbook aid to students always results in at least an
indirect benefit to the school, since funds are thus released for other purposes. 24 Un-
less the theory is qualified in some way, it can be used as a rationale for public expen-
ditures for any educational purpose, since all educational projects are beneficial to
the public. 25
In addition to viewing the textbook statute as indirect aid, the dissent in Allen
333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Court's latest formula is: "to withstand the strictures of the Es-
tablishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963).
20. Board of Educ. v. Allen, supra note 6, at 117, 228 N.E.2d at 794-95, 281 N.Y.S.2d at
804-05.
21. The matter of free textbooks arose previously in Smith v. Donahue, 202 App. Div.
656, 664, 195 N.Y.S. 715, 722 (1922), where the appellate division held:
It seems to us to be giving a strained and unusual meaning to words if we hold that
the books and the ordinary school supplies, when furnished for the use of pupils, is a
furnishing to the pupils, and not a furnishing in aid or maintenance of a school of
learning. It seems very plain that such furnishing is at least indirectly in aid of the in-
stitution, and that, if not in actual violation of the words, it is in violation of the true
intent and meaning of the Constitution, and in consequence equally unconstitutional.
Smith was cited with approval in Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576
(1938), which struck down a busing statute and rejected the argument that such transpor-
tation was in aid of the pupils and not the schools.
22. It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state that the public welfare and
safety require that the state and local communities give assistance to educational pro-
grams which are important to our national defense and the general welfare of the state.
LAWS OF N.Y., ch. 320, § 1 (1965).
23. Board of Educ. v. Allen, supra note 6, at 116, 228 N.E.2d at 794, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
The court's holding under the Blaine Amendment almost became a moot point. On Aug.
16, 1967, the Ninth New York Constitutional Convention voted 132 to 49 to repeal the
Blaine Amendment. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 4. The proposed draft of art. 1,
§ 1 merely repeats the prohibitions of the first amendment. On Nov. 7, 1967, New York's
voters rejected the convention's work.
For an interesting subjective account of the long and stormy history of the Blaine Amend-
ment, see Rice, The New York State Constitution and Aid to Church-Related Schools, 12
CATHOLIC LAw. 272 (1966).
24. La Noue, supra note 14, at 93.
25. Dickman v. School Dist., supra note 11, at 244, 366 P.2d at 539-40.
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foresees an endless controversy, with political implications, as to what books are sec-
ular, since the majority fails to lay down a determinative formula. The dissenters do
not feel that any book used in public schools can be called secular, since subjects like
history, literature and art all embrace religious subject matter, and such texts would
easily serve as tools to teach a particular religious view. 26 Parochial authorities, more-
over, might exert pressure to have certain texts adopted. Equally dangerous, the stat-
ute could allow the state to control instruction in church-related schools in violation
of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 27
If the child benefit theory is no longer tenable, what kind of a test, if any, can be
devised that would draw a discernible line between permissible and unconstitutional
aid? The Supreme Court's latest formula-" [T]here must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... "28-is not
clearly determinative. 29 One writer has suggested that an alternative might be to
recognize that a parochial school is not a "religious institution" for purposes of the
establishment clause.30 Such an argument might be acceptable for some religiously
affiliated colleges, 81 but to say that the typical parochial elementary or high school is
not a religious institution would clearly be adopting an unrealistic legal fiction.
Equally unrealistic, however, would be the adoption of the absolutist position,
which holds that all church-state contact is forbidden by the "no law" provision of
the first amendment, and that no other consideration is relevant.32 Judicial extrem-
ism in the pursuit of a workable constitutional principle is no virtue where it causes
grave societal disorder, unless a more essential overriding interest is upheld.8 A court
cannot blind itself to the fact that in the United States today, more than seven million
students, or approximately one-eighth of the school population, are enrolled in private
schools, most of which are sectarian in character.3 4 In New York State, approximately
nine hundred thousand students from kindergarten through high school-or twenty
percent of the state total-attend nonpublic schools. Of these, seven hundred eighty
26. See discussion of this idea in Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., supra note 19, at 206. See also Dickman v. School Dist.,
supra note 11, at 240, 366 P.2d at 536. There the Oregon court found the use of state-furnished
textbooks "inextricably connected with the teaching of religious concepts." The Catholic
Archdiocese of Portland had prepared its own supplements to the secular textbooks provided
by the state, a result likely to occur in other states supplying such aid.
27. Board of Educ. v. Allen, supra note 6, at 123, 228 N.E.2d at 798, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
28. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra note 19, at 222.
29. In applying the Schempp test, Judge Kane of the New York Supreme Court and Jus-
tice Staley of the appellate division reached opposite conclusions in the principal case. Board
of Educ. v. Allen, supra note 4, at 303, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 246; Board of Educ. v. Allen, supra
note 5, at 84, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 245 (concurring opinion).
30. Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An Historical Perspec-
tive, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1460 (1966).
31. See the test applied in Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645,
220 A.2d 51, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
32. See Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167 (1963). As an example of the extreme
absolutist approach, see Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Engel v. Vitale, supra
note 15, at 437.
33. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) can be viewed as a decision justi-
fiably causing social disorder to uphold an essential principle, i.e., equal protection.
34. NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE, SUMMARY OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION 1962 &
1963, at 32, 42 (1965).
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thousand are enrolled in Roman Catholic schools. If New York's public schools had
to absorb these pupils, the additional annual cost has been estimated as $800 mil-
lion.3 5 Warning flags have been raised indicating that the parochial educational
system cannot be maintained at a level of competence without some kind of public
assistance.36 The New York legislature, in passing its textbook statute, recognized the
need for both the parochial school system and standards within it as a matter of pub-
lic policy.3 7 These considerations are irrelevant from the absolutist point of view,
but absolutism has not been enshrined as the only alternative.
More viable than the absolutist approach, it is submitted, is the "balancing test,"3 8
or what Solicitor General and former Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold refers to as the
"comprehensive" or "integral" approach:
Instead of focusing on a few words, and ignoring all else, including the ef-
fect and meaning of those words, as distinguished from their apparent im-
pact when isolated from everything else, as the absolutist . . . approach
does, the comprehensive or integral approach accepts the task of the judge
as one which involves the effect of all the provisions of the Constitution, not
merely in a narrow literal sense, but in a living, organic sense, including the
elaborate and complex governmental structure which the Constitution,
through its words, has erected.3 9
Taking into cognizance the role played by the parochial school in the historical de-
velopment of American education, as recognized by nonjudicial governmental units,
it may not matter constitutionally that some benefit passes to the institution from the
public treasury, since the general public requires and benefits substantially from the
continuance in operation of parochial school systems. Although some state constitu-
tions present their own problems, "the [federal] Constitution does not demand that
every friendly gesture between church and State shall be discountenanced. The so-
called 'wall of separation' may be built so high and so broad as to impair both State
and church, as we have come to know them."40
If this position is adopted, the question becomes, how much benefit to an institu-
tion that is both educational and religious can be permitted before the establishment
and free exercise clauses demand a severance? 41 It is submitted that a practical test
35. Hacker, The 'Blaine Amendment'--Yes or No, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1967, § 6 (Magazine)
at 27, 29, 72.
36. E.g., the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference recently released a study warning that un-
less nonpublic education were subsidized, there might be a massive influx of pupils into the
public school system. Twenty-three percent or six hundred thousand of Pennsylvania's
pupils are enrolled in nonpublic schools. The study estimated that if these students were
forced to transfer to public schools it would cost Pennsylvania $200 million in additional
operating costs alone. Capital costs involved in the construction of new schools and the pro-
vision of new equipment and furnishings would amount to $1.2 .billion. N.Y. Times, Aug.
20, 1967, at 72, col. 3.
37. Supra note 22.
38. For an extensive listing of Supreme Court cases dealing with "balancing" in consti-
.tutional adjudication, see Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424,
1427-33 (1962).
39. Griswold, supra note 32, at 172-73.
40. Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161, 172, 100 N.E.2d 463, 467 (1951), aft'd, 343 U.S. 306
(1952).
41. Cf. Note, 20 VAND. L. REv. 640, 647 (1967).
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for determining this question might be to inquire not only "whether the statute aids
religion but whether the statute presents any of the particular dangers the first
amendment is intended to prevent." 42 Such a test would not provide parochial
schools with a carte blanche for all types of aid. Such a test may require adjustment
and compromise by parochial school authorities in order to qualify for aid. But it is,
after all, a balancing of interests approach that is being suggested.
The need for a different and more conclusive test is clear, as litigation in the field
is multiplying. The Eighty-ninth Congress included within the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965 provisions to grant funds to private as well as public
schools for library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials for students
and teachers, and programs for the educationally deprived. 48 The legislation was
drawn with the child benefit theory in view as its constitutional basis.44 So far the
heavy hand of Frothingham v. Mellon45 has defeated attempts to obtain an adjudica-
tion on the merits as to the constitutionality of these expenditures.4 6 But this obstacle
may soon be removed.47
The spectre of churches waging war against the government and each other in the
courts over the issue of aid to sectarian education is more reminiscent of the six-
42. Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1353, 1357 (1964).
43. 79 Stat. 27 (1965), 20 U.S.C. § 241 (a)-(l) (Supp. I, 1965); 79 Stat. 36 (1965), 20
U.S.C. §§ 821-85 (Supp. I, 1965).
44. One of the drafters of the Act, Representative Hugh L. Carey, quipped:
The bill we drew and passed was in truth a "well watered" child benefit bill in every
sense. It was "watered" in the sense that H20 is the simplest solvent in the field of
chemistry. Therefore, whenever we ran into a complication in the bill involving needy
children, or textbooks, or supplementary centers, or research projects we sprinkled in
the simple solvent of child benefit and it dissolved the blockages to successful passage.
Carey, The Child Benefit System in Operation-Federal Style, 12 CATHOLIC LAw. 185, 187
(1966). See also Taylor, Federal Aid for Children and Teachers in All Schools, 12 CATHOLIC
LAw. 193 (1966).
Shortly after the program was enacted, New York Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz
ruled that the Blaine Amendment would not inhibit administration of the Act in New
York as long as federal funds bore the entire cost, and that state and local funds were at no
time commingled with the federal funds. N.Y. Arr'y GEN., July 15, 1965.
45. 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923):
The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is in-
valid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally.
46. Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. United
States, 266 F. Supp. 473 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y.),
motion to convene three judge panel granted, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. ), prob. juris. noted,
88 S. Ct. 218 (1967). Two more suits have been filed challenging the Act, in the Pennsylvania
Common Pleas Court against the Philadelphia School District and in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare. Plaintiffs in both cases are several church associations in the Philadelphia area.
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1967, at 12, col. 4.
47. The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in Flast v. Gardner, supra note
46. Oral arguments will be heard before the end of 1967. See District Judge Frankel's dis-
sent in Flast v. Gardner, supra note 46, at 4-18, for a compelling argument for the appel-
lants.
Even if the Court affirms Flast, parties might gain standing to sue by Congressional act.
A bill introduced by Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr. would permit taxpayers to challenge in federal
court loans or grants to church-related schools under nine federal laws. The bill passed the
Senate on April 11, 1967. S. 3, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
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teenth century than the ecumenically minded latter half of the twentieth. The Su-
preme Court is rightfully expected to resolve the controversy; 4s its answer should be
a conclusive one.
The realm of religious training and belief remains, as the [first] Amend-
ment made it, the kingdom of the individual man and his God. It should be
kept inviolately private, not "entangled ... in precedents" or confounded
with what legislatures legitimately may take over into the public domain. 49
But the baby should not be thrown out with the bath. The need of quality education
for all is vital to the nation. "The taking of extreme positions leads too often to what
may be in part self-inflicted wounds, which the Court can ill afford to endure when
its task is so difficult at its best."5 0
48. E.g., Harold Howe, U.S. Commissioner of Education, has stated, "[t]he courts would
have to clarify what Federally financed services could be given to students of church-related
schools.... [W]ithout court rulings... Federal and state education agencies will continue to
have problems." N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1966, at 43, col. 5.
49. Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 12, at 57-58 (Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent).
50. Griswold, supra note 32, at 181.
Copyrights-Employee Status-Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover,
268 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1967).
Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover delivered a number of speeches which plaintiff
Public Affairs Associates, Inc., an educational publisher, wished to quote in a book
it was planning to publish. Permission to quote was refused, since the speeches were
to be included in a forthcoming book of Rickover's speeches and his publishers
threatened suit if Public Affairs continued with its plans. A suit was then instituted
against Rickover for a declaratory judgment as to 23 speeches which, plaintiff claim-
ed, were government publications and therefore not subject to copyright.' The suit
was dismissed. 2 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that none of the speeches were government publications, but reversed
and remanded to determine to what extent the first 22 speeches might have been
dedicated to the public by publication without notice of copyright.3 The Supreme
Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case, declaring the record below to
be insufficient regarding the preparation of the speeches and the nature and scope
of Rickover's duties.4 Public Affairs then filed amended pleadings, adding a speech
1. "No copyright shall subsist... in any publication of the United States Government ......
17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
2. The case was dismissed on the ground that the speeches were not made as part of Rick-
over's official duties and, therefore, were not publications of the United States Government
within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 177 F.
Supp. 601 (D.D.C. 1959).
3. Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
4. Administrative practice should have been considered also. Public Affairs Assocs., Inc.
v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962).
1967]
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previously not in issue5 and joining additional defendants. 6 In this final disposition
the rights to only two speeches were in question, Rickover having abandoned his
rights to the first 22, which were delivered and distributed without a copyright no-
tice. 7 The two speeches-the Shippingport speech8 and an address on education 9-
bore copyright notices and were prepared by the Admiral in his spare time, typed by
his administrative assistant, and duplicated on government machines for security
review and press release. Both speeches were delivered after working hours, but
while the Admiral was on official business trips. At the time the speeches were deliv-
ered, Rickover held a position with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which
gave him responsibility for the Shippingport station. The court considered the wide
discretion involved in the Admiral's position, but held: Speeches prepared and
delivered by a government official in his spare time, using government facilities only
for the purpose of duplication for security clearance and press release, and involving
matters not closely related to his official duties, were his private property for which
he was entitled to a copyright.' 0
At common law an author had the right of first publication." This common law
copyright, which still exists today, is a complete protection from infringement until
the author publishes' 2 or makes clear by some overt act' 3 that he intends to abandon
his property rights or dedicate the work to the public. 14 Such manifestation of intent
must be a general publication, an unrestricted dissemination of the work, as opposed
to a limited publication, communication to a select group for a specific purpose
without the right of reproduction or dissemination. Under the federal copyright laws
5. Speech by Admiral Hyman Rickover, The Shippingport Atomic Power Station-Lessons
From Its Operation, American Public Power Association Convention, May 28, 1959.
6. Additional defendants were: (1) the Secretary of Defense; (2) the Secretary of the
Navy; (3) the Commissioners of the Atomic Energy Commission; (4) the Register of Copy-
rights; and (5) the Librarian of Congress.
7. This distribution, which was not limited to the press, but extended to members of the
general public who requested copies, probably cost Rickover his property rights through
forfeiture.
8. Supra note 5.
9. Speech by Admiral Hyman Rickover, Education-Our First Line of Defense, Harvard
Club, Dec. 11, 1958.
10. Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444, 450 (D.D.C. 1967). The Copy-
right Law revisions which are being considered by Congress would produce the same result.
A bill introduced in the Senate on February 4, 1965, has been criticized in letters from the
American Newspaper Publishers Association and the National Newspaper Association. S.
1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Section 105 of the proposed bill would provide that copy-
right protection is not available for a work of the United States Government, which is de-
fined as "a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government within
the scope of his official duties or employment." Id. § 105 (b). Both newspaper groups argue
that if the clause defining official duties is narrowly interpreted, it will not afford adequate
protection for the public. The argument continues that no copyright should be allowed on
any material which is largely created by government employees or with government funds.
This interpretation is in direct opposition to the policies expressed in Rickover.
11. See Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 F. 196 (2d Cir. 1896).
12. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Con-
tinental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 *(2d Cir. 1958); Patterson v. Century Prods.,
Inc., 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937).
13. Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532, 542-43 (1872); National Comics Pub., Inc. v. Fawcett
Pub., Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951).
14. National Comics Pub., Inc. v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., supra note 13.
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the author is protected, upon the placing of notice on each copy published or offered
for sale, 15 for a term of years subject to renewal. Copyright privileges may be for-
feited, but a much wider publication and stronger indication of intent to abandon
is required to accomplish this than is required to lose a common law copyright.16
Most of the cases concerning the creative expression of an employee during his
employment arise out of disputes over the ownership of a tangible object, such as
an invention, rather than a literary product.17 Perhaps the analogy is not perfect,
but it is the one that the courts use. In the patron cases (commissioning of an artist
or employment of a photographer) it has been widely held that the work produced
under such a contract belongs to the employer unless otherwise specified within the
contract.' 8 This is true also where the resulting invention is the specific object of
the employment contract.' 9 Similarly, no difficulty arises in situations in which the
employee's efforts are totally unrelated to his employment and accomplished on his
own time without use of the employer's facilities. It is in the nebulous gray area in-
volved in the instant case that the courts have not followed a set pattern. The mere
existence of the employer-employee relationship, even in a case where the employee
has used the employer's facilities in his creative efforts, has been held to be insuffi-
cient in itself to raise the presumption of ownership in the employer.20 There must
be an express or implied agreement between the parties that the employer should
hold title,2 1 although, absent such agreement, the employer may be entitled to an
irrevocable license in the invention.22
The rights of the employer do not depend upon the original contract of employ-
ment, but upon the employee's present duties; if the employee engages in experi-
ments for the purpose of creating an invention while accepting a salary for his work,
the employer owns the resulting product.23 This is true also of a written work.24 But
a skilled workman employed to devise improvements in a manufacturing process
15. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1964):
Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publica-
tion thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such notice shall
be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by au-
thority of the copyright proprietor, except in the case of books seeking ad interim pro-
tection under section 22 of this title.
16. See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 462 (1962); Comment, Literary Property and Con-
tracts of Hire, 5 DE PAUL L. REv. 256 (1956).
17. See, e.g., Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-
Peet Co., 175 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1949); Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1928).
18. Avedon v. Exstein, 141 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Grant v. Kellogg Co., 58 F. Supp.
48 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), afj'd, 154 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1946); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108
F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1939); Lumiere v. Robertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550 (2d Cir. 1922);
Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900).
19. See, e.g., Shook v. United States, 238 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
924 (1957).
20. Marshall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., supra note 17.
21. Dinwiddie v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Coal Co., 64 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1933).
22. Ibid.; Moffett v. Fiske, 51 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
23. Houghton v. United States, supra note 17.
24. United States Ozone Co. v. United States Ozone Co. of America, 62 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.
1932).
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is entitled to the patents on any resulting inventions, unless a contrary intent has
been manifested. 25
The analysis of the parties' rights in an employer-employee relationship is
of equal difficulty with the problem of discerning what constitutes official action.
The written records of a government official executed in the discharge of his official
duties are government property and, therefore, not copyrightable. 2 6 Hence, a court
reporter may not copyright his reports, 2 7 and a map prepared to accompany an offi-
cial report is government property. 2 8 It has been said that the action, to constitute
an official act, need not be prescribed by statute or by a written regulation, but it
may be found in the established usage of the government department or of the par-
ticular position held.2 9 However, the reports of a city engineer pertaining to survey-
ing done at the request and expense of individual homeowners were held to be the
engineer's personal property, not part of the official records of his office which, by
statute, were to be turned over to his successor.8 0
There seems to have been little discernible difference in the treatment of public
and private employees by the courts. In neither case have the courts been overanx-
ious to give title to one who is not the creator. But the decisions, especially in earlier
cases, have not been uniform, the courts looking at various times to the intent
of the parties8 ' or to implied agreements. 8 2 Rickover is a clarification of this area of
the law. The wide discretion allowed Rickover by his position83 was scrutinized by
the court. The subject matter of the speeches was adjudged to be unrelated to the
Admiral's official duties, although he had a peculiar knowledge of the Shippingport
station because of his connection with the AEC.34 In the case of Moffett v. Fiske,S5 the
court, in finding an irrevocable license in the government to use an invention (a
device for dropping torpedoes from airplanes by gravity) made by a naval officer,
stressed the character of his employment as intellectual rather than manual. It fur-
ther noted his education and training by the government which enabled him to de-
velop the product. In Rickover, the court is more concerned with the rights of the
official himself, pointing to the handling of the speeches by the Admiral as "private
business from start to finish"8 6 as illustrated by their subject matter and by the au-
diences to whom they were delivered. The key word "intention" governed, and cor-
25. Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315 (1893).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964).
27. Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 604 (No. 8394) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851).
28. Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co., 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944).
29. United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914).
30. Leffingwell v. Miller, 20 Colo. App. 429, 79 P. 327 (1905).
31. See, e.g., Cohan v. Richmond, 19 F. Supp. 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
32. See, e.g., Dinwiddie v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Coal Co., supra note 21, at 306.
33. A memorandum from the Chief of Naval Personnel to Rickover, dated 14 November
1955, set out in a footnote by the court, stated that Rickover's duties with the AEC reactor
program allowed him to "deal directly with any agency under the purview of the Secretary
of the Navy, as your performance of duty may indicate and require." Similar discretion was
given to Rickover in his additional duty with the Bureau of Ships. Public Affairs Assocs.,
Inc. v. Rickover, supra note 10, at 446-47 n.2.
34. The speech was aimed at administrators rather than scientists. The court stated that
the information contained in the speech had long been public knowledge.
35. 51 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
36. Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, supra note 10, at 449.
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respondence between Rickover and the American Public Power Association was
used by the court to show that the Association had approached the Admiral as a pri-
vate citizen.8 7
The divergent approaches of the Moffett and Rickover courts must be attributed
in part to the subject matter of the disputes. In the former it is a tangible object,
an invention, in the latter, a literary product. But the major reason would appear
to be a trend evident in recent cases to protect an author, specifically a public figure,
as completely as possible from infringement of his intellectual property. In King v.
Mister Maestro, Inc.,3 8 the court concerned itself with general publication, which,
as was noted earlier, 9 must be shown in order to deprive an author of his common
law privilege of copyright. Here, Dr. Martin Luther King delivered a speech to a
vast audience via radio and television and distributed copies to the press. The court,
while stating that intent was unimportant, held that this was not such a general pub-
lication that it amounted to an abandonment or dedication to the public domain.
It is not easy to see this result following logically from the prior cases treating this
issue. Opinions variously held that intent was important40 and that it was not;41 that
publication of a story in two newspapers was general publication 42 and that exhibi-
tion of a painting in a gallery to which the public was admitted for a fee (with copy-
ing expressly prohibited) was not.48 The two areas involved in King and Rickover
are closely related. The finding of general publication in the former, or of relation
to official duties in the latter, would destroy the author's property rights. In view of
the realities of the mass media, their growth and influence, the courts recognize a
need to protect not only the public figure, but the general public as well. The de-
velopment of the law of libel has followed this general policy also.44
The statements and ideas of public figures are important sources of information
and their immediate dissemination is a matter of public concern. Creative energies
will be encouraged by removing as many barriers to their exercise as possible. A
policy which gives the greatest freedom to the intellectual pursuits of great men
without the imposition of liability, when ideas are shared with an audience which
has an interest in and a right to hear them, makes immediate and widespread pub-
lication an attractive avenue of conduct for the creator. Rickover recognizes and
embodies this policy.
37. Ibid.
38. 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
39. See text supra at notes 11-16.
40. See, e.g., Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 435, 194 A. 631 (1937);
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
41. National Comics Pub., Inc. v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., supra note 13; Holmes v. Hurst. 174
U.S. 82 (1899).
42. Hirsch v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 207 Misc. 750, 144 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup.
Ct. 1955).
43. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, supra note 40.
44. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Eminent Domain-Compensation-Effect Given a Lessee's Unexercised Op-
tion to Renew Lease or Purchase Land--Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Commis-
sion,--Md.-- , 229 A.2d 576 (1967).
Sholom, Inc., a lessee, occupied property in Maryland under a five-year lease, with
options to extend the lease for two additional five-year terms, and with an option to
purchase the property any time during the original five-year term. The Maryland
State Roads Commission initiated condemnation proceedings designed to take two
parcels of the property for public use. This taking by the Commission adversely
affected the value of the property, hampering both parking convenience and acces-
sibility to the combination tavern, liquor store and grocery, which was the property's
chief asset. At the condemnation proceedings before the Prince George's County
Circuit Court,' the trial judge ruled that, because the options were not exercised prior
to the taking, Sholom's compensable interest must be restricted to the residue of the
first five-year term. Subsequently, the jury awarded $34,000 as total condemnation
damage, of which $30,500 was apportioned to the lessor, and $3,500 to the lessee. The
lessee appealed from this judgment, both as to the total award and as to the manner
in which the award was apportioned between the lessor and the lessee. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland reversed, and held: the lessee was entitled to compensation
either for the value of a fifteen-year lease or for its option to purchase, although not
for both. The case was then remanded for a reevaluation of the size of the award.2
The Supreme Court first considered federal eminent domain powers in 1875,3 and
the powers of the various states have since been similarly defined.4 In a country
which recognizes the rights and interests of persons in private property, measures
were adopted early in our history to compensate those individuals whose property
was taken for public use.5 With the fifth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion as a model, the states have uniformly provided in their constitutions that "just
compensation" be paid whenever the property interest of a person is taken under
the power of eminent domain.6 Despite these safeguards, problems arise as to what
is "just compensation." In Sholom, it was the peculiarities of a leasehold which per-
plexed the court.
1. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, Law No. 19,328 (Cir. Ct., Pr. Geo.'s County, May
17, 1966).
2. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, - Md.-, 229 A.2d 576 (1967).
3. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875). For a general review, see Waite, Government
Power and Private Property, 16 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 283 (1967).
4. The power of eminent domain has been viewed as an inherent, fundamental, and es-
sential sovereign right of the states. See, e.g., Conners v. City of New Haven, 101 Conn. 191,
125 A. 375 (1924); Ellis v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 86, 120 N.E.2d 719 (1954).
5. Barring constitutional limitations, it has been suggested that private property could
theoretically be taken for public use without payment to the owner, but the requirement of
just compensation was imbedded in the common law. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 178 (1871); Baltimore & F. Turnpike Rd. v. Baltimore, C. & E. M. P.
Ry., 81 Md. 247, 256, 31 A. 854, 855 (1895).
6. E.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 40; CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 14. For a history of the Maryland
section, see Patterson v. Baltimore, 127 Md. 233, 96 A. 458 (1915). For a general discussion
of the law of eminent domain and compensation in Maryland, see Baker & Altfeld, Mary-
land's New Condemnation Code, 23 MD. L. REv. 309 (1963). See also 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 1.2 (3d rev. ed. 1964).
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Generally, the measure of compensation in condemnation cases is the fair market
value of the premises taken; generally, this also applies to leasehold situations.7
There are cases reported, however, which recognize that "market value" is not al-
ways a just test when evaluating leasehold interests. 8 Within a lessor-lessee relation-
ship there may be a multitude of variables which make it exceedingly difficult to
establish a market value. 9 In fact, a leasehold interest often has no market value per
se; in these situations, some jurisdictions have held it to be proper and necessary
to prove every factor and element showing the actual or "intrinsic value" of the
leasehold.10 Two examples of elements which may be peculiar to leaseholds, are op-
tions to renew the lease or to purchase the property; both are present in Sholom.
Because the options had not been exercised prior to the condemnation, the question
before the Maryland court was whether an unexercised option was compensable.
Effect Given Option to Renew Lease
The court first considered whether, in fixing the amount of the lessee's compensa-
tion, the quantum of its interest must be limited to the residue of the original five-
year term or whether, in the alternative, it should be extended to compensate for
an additional ten years. In other words, could the condemning party be compelled
to pay the lessee that amount which it would have been required to pay had it exer-
cised its options to renew the lease? A majority of jurisdictions hold the general rule
to be that a lessee is entitled to compensation for an option to renew."
Although it was admitted that Sholom would have exercised its options to renew
the lease but for the condemnation proceeding, the trial judge reasoned that
Sholom's options were of no compensable value when not excercised before the
taking. The court of appeals determined, however, that under the circumstances
this was immaterial.' 2 The appellate court cited two Maryland cases holding that
(1) a lessee can recover for at least the length of an unexpired term, and a cancella-
tion of a lease after condemnation is not necessarily an assignment of the award to
the lessor' s and (2) that, in the right circumstances, the jury could properly con-
7. United States v. Advertising Checking Bureau, Inc., 204 F2d 770 (7th Cir. 1953). See
also Commercial Del. Serv., Inc. v. Medema, 7 Ill. App. 2d 419, 129 N.E.2d 579 (1955); In re
Cross-Bronx Expressway, 195 Misc. 842, 82 N.Y.S.2d 55 (Sup. Ct. 1948). See Comment, Emi-
nent Domain: Compensation for Leasehold Interest Where No Provision in Lease, 48 MAlQ.
L. REv. 90, 93 (1964).
8. E.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 380-81, rehearing denied, 327 U.S.
818 (1946).
9. For a description of the elusive "fair market" value standard, see 1 L. ORGEL, VALUA-
TION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 15 (2d ed. 1953).
10. E.g., Korf v. Fleming, 329 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d 85 (1948). See also 4 P. NICHoLs, EM-
INENT DOMAIN § 12.321[1] (3d rev. ed. 1964).
That "market value" might not be a good measure of damages in all cases is not a new
thought. See, e.g., Mayor & City Council v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905); Pierson
v. H. R. Leonard Furniture Co., 268 Mich. 507, 256 N.W. 529 (1934).
11. E.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., supra note 8; United States v. 425,031 Square
Feet of Land, 187 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1951); New Jersey Highway Auth. v. J. & F. Holding
Co., 40 N.J. Super. 309, 123 A.2d 25 (1956). See generally 29 (A) C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§ 143, at 617 (1965).
12. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 2, at 580.
13. Vein v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 545, 145 A.2d 613 (1958).
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sider the probability that the lease will be renewed. 14 Although the precise question
in Sholom, i.e., whether or not an unexercised option to renew a lease is a compen-
sable interest, was unresolved in Maryland, a number of jurisdictions had previously
held it to be a property right requiring compensation when taken.15
The Sholom court placed particular reliance on the Connecticut case of
Canterbury Realty Co. v. Ives, 16 quoting from it:
"In approving the referee's conclusion that Saidel's lease was of no value
because the option to renew had not been exercised before the taking, the
court was in error. Every kind of right or interest in property which has a
market value must be compensated for in condemnation proceedings. [Cit-
ing cases.] Saidel, as lessee, was entitled to receive, as nearly as possible, a
fair equivalent in money for the loss of his lease. [Citing cases.] In a deter-
mination of what this amount should be, all elements legitimately affecting
the value of the lease should be considered. [Citing cases.] The renewal
options which, if exercised, would serve to convert the lease from one having
nearly six years left to run into one having nearly twenty-one years of po-
tential life, were, therefore, elements properly to be considered in a deter-
mination of the value of the lease. [Citing cases.]' 7 (Emphasis added by
Sholom court.)
The Sholom court concluded that the unexercised options to renew the lease were
compensable under the circumstances, inasmuch as representatives of Sholom had
testified that, but for the taking, the option would have been exercised. The question
remains, however: lacking the special circumstances present in Sholom, would the
court have reached the same conclusion? Regardless of whether or not there is any
evidence of a desire to exercise the options, should not the lessee receive compensa-
tion when the option is open and exercisable any time during the term, even up to
the last day? Should not the paramount objective of just compensation be to place
the lessor and lessee in a position comparable to that which they would have enjoyed
had the property not been taken? 18
Effect Given Option to Purchase
In determining the second issue involved in Sholom, i.e., the troublesome question
of the unexercised option to purchase, the court found that there was a split in the
case law of various jurisdictions. It is generally held that a lessee with an option to
purchase the premises is not entitled to compensation for his option where it is not
exercised prior to the taking.' 9 These jurisdictions theorize that the optionee with
14. Mayor & City Council v. Rice, 73 Md. 307, 21 A. 181 (1891).
15. See, e.g., Land Clearance for Redevelop. Corp. v. Doernhoefer, 389 S.W.2d 780 (Mo.
1965); In re Port of New York Auth., 2 N.Y.2d 296, 140 N.E.2d 740, 159 N.Y.S.2d 825
(1957).
16. 153 Conn. 377, 216 A.2d 426 (1966).
17. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 2, at 581.
18. Connecticut has recognized the intricacies which can be involved in leasehold cases
and has suggested that the question of what is just compensation is equitable in nature,
rather than strictly legal or technical. See Waesche v. Redevelopment Agency, - Conn.
-, 229 A.2d 352, 354 (1967); Colaluca v. Ives, 150 Conn. 521, 191 A.2d 340 (1963).
19. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727
(1960); State v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 40 N.J. 560, 193 A.2d 244 (1963). See generally 29 (A)
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 196 (1965).
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an unexercised option has nothing but a continuing, irrevocable offer to sell from
the optionor, and not an interest in realty which is compensable. 20 There is a sub-
stantial minority which views an unexercised option as a property right and therefore
compensable. 21 It was this latter view which appealed to the Sholom court.
The Maryland court quotes from the court of appeals in Nicholson v. Weaver:22
"When the lease containing the option to purchase covenant was taken by
the Government it still had about eighteen months to run before all con-
tractual rights and obligations between the lessor and lessee thereunder
terminated. The action of the condemnor did not abrogate such rights. It
operated to transfer the potency of them from Parcel Eight to the compensa-
tory fund or award." 23
The Nicholson court, therefore, found a doctrine of equitable assignment appli-
cable, whereby the contractual rights between the lessor and the lessee were not
destroyed, but were only transferred to the compensatory fund. In this case, the
$7,000 award was apportioned, $4,000 to the lessor (representing the price stated
in his original offer to sell), with $3,000 going to the lessee (representing the value
of the option to him). In those jurisdictions which hold that an unexercised option
to purchase is compensable, therefore, the value of the option (to the lessee) is held
to be the difference between the condemnation award and the price stated in the
option.24
The Sholom court also refers at length to the case of In re Appeal of Synes.25 There,
the optionee did not occupy the status of a lessee but in reversing, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania stated:
"We cannot agree that the acceptance of the return of the $9,000 down pay-
ment worked an election to cancel the agreement. His acceptance of this
money took place a considerable time after the act of condemnation. Fur-
thermore, the condemnation of the property having made an affirmative ex-
ercise of the option impossible in any event, appellant could do little else
but get his money back. He didn't elect to purchase, it is true; but he didn't
elect to cancel, either. The condemnation caused the loss of his right to
elect to purchase. Surely, this must have possessed some value-it took a
$9,000 down payment to secure itJ ' '26
Synes, it must be remembered, involved an optionee who was not a lessee, and the
Maryland court emphatically distinguishes it from Sholom:
It must not be supposed that our discussion of In re Petition of Governor
Mifflin, etc., [In re Appeal of Synes] supra, amounts to a holding that the
20. E.g., Cravero v. Florida Turnpike Auth., 91 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1956); City of Ashland v.
Kittle, 347 S.W.2d 522 (Ky. 1961).
21. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Weaver, 194 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1952); In re Appeal of Synes,
401 Pa. 387, 164 A.2d 221 (1960). For a general discussion of both minority and majority
views on this subject, see Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REv.
477 (1962).
22. Nicholson v. Weaver, supra note 21.
23. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 2, at 581.
24. Nicholson v. Weaver, supra note 21; 23 Tracts of Land v. United States, 177 F.2d 967
(6th Cir. 1949); In re Appeal of Synes, supra note 21.
25. In re Appeal of Synes, supra note 21.
26. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 2, at 582.
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owner of a bare unexercised option to buy has a compensable interest in a
condemnation proceeding against the owner of record. That question is not
now before us. Sholom's option to buy, it will be recalled, is ancillary to its
interest in the property as a lessee .... 27 (Emphasis added.)
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals in Sholom did not adopt the holding
of Synes, they did use it to support their position that a lessee's unexercised option
to purchase was compensable. It is believed that this is a just and equitable
solution to a question which appears to have been one of first impression in Mary-
land. An option to purchase can be considered in conjunction with all other evi-
dence in arriving at a "just compensation" figure in leasehold cases. Query-what
result if the question of an unexercised option in the hands of one other than a les-
see was now litigated in Maryland?
Division of Award Between Lessor and Lessee
The final issue in Sholom involved the determination of the award itself. On ap-
peal, the Roads Commission argued that, even if the court decided that the lessee
was entitled to greater compensation, the jury award of $34,000 could not be dis-
turbed; the lessee could only look to the lessor for a larger portion of the original
award. This position is not without support. There are jurisdictions which hold that
the proper approach in condemnation proceedings is to value the property as though
the entire title is vested in one person, and then apportion the award among the
contending interests. 28 This rationale holds that the condemning party ought not to
be required to pay more for the two interests (lessor and lessee) than the portion
taken would be worth if owned by one person.29
The Sholom court could not, however, accept the Commission's argument. Having
found that Sholom's options were compensable, they did not agree that the $34,000
award should merely be reapportioned. The court felt that the size of the award
should reflect the total of both the lessor's and the lessee's interests. They found
support in early Maryland case law. The Sholom court quotes from Gluck v. Mayor
& City Council of Baltimore:30
"The owner of the leasehold, and the owner of the reversion, together hold
the fee-simple estate. Each has a distinct estate of property. * * * Whatever
be the method of ascertaining the values of these distinct interests, it is
evident that the sum of those values must be the full value of the property
taken." 8 ' (Emphasis added by Sholom court.)
The case of Mayor & City Council v. Latrobe,8 2 recognized that there were excep-
tions to the general rule in Maryland that the total allowance to all interest holders
27. Ibid.
28. See, e.g., Gawzner v. Lebenbaum, 180 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1950); Wayne Co. v. Newo,
Inc., 75 N.J. Super. 100, 182 A.2d 369 (1962); Stanpack Realty Corp. v. City of Norfolk, 199
Va. 716, 101 S.E.2d 527 (1958).
29. See generally 27 J. LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 483 (3d ed. 1909).
30. 81 Md. 315, 32 A. 515 (1895).
31. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 2, at 583. See also Baltimore v. Gamse
& Bro., 132 Md. 290, 104 A. 429 (1918).
32. Supra note 10.
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(lessors and lessees) could not exceed the value of the land taken, plus consequential
damages.38 In Latrobe, the court felt that the condemning party might be made to
pay more than it would if one person owned the property, if the evidence showed
that the value of the leasehold interest in property subject to an irredeemable ground
rent exceeded the balance remaining after deducting from the award the value of
the reversionary interest.
No irredeemable ground rent was involved in Sholom, but it was not difficult for
the court to conclude that, once the lessee's unexercised options were held compen-
sable, a new determination of the award must be heard, with the result that the
condemning party compensate for all interests taken.
The court could not have crystallized the basis of their decision more succinctly
than by quoting, as they did, from Mr. Justice Holmes' remarks in Boston Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Boston:34
"* * *[T]he Constitution does not require a disregard of the mode of owner-
ship-of the state of the title. It does not require a parcel of land to be valued
as an unencumbered whole when it is not held as an unencumbered whole.
It merely requires that an owner of property taken should be paid for what
is taken from him. It deals with persons, not with tracts of land. And the
question is, What has the owner lost? not, What has the taker gained,"35
In Sholom, the State Roads Commission took only a small portion of a tract of land,
but in doing so they took from two distinct persons; the lessor and the lessee both
had property rights in the parcels taken and both should be compensated.
In a country which is witnessing an ever-increasing exercise of the government's
eminent domain power in road construction and urban renewal projects, the prob-
lem of what constitutes "just compensation" will continually arise. There is little
doubt that the Maryland decision holding a lessee's unexercised options compen-
sable and entitled to constitutional protection is an equitable one; for this reason
Sholom should have a persuasive effect on future litigation involving the taking of
multi-owned property for public use.
33. See Lustine v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 274, 142 A.2d 566 (1958).
34. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
35. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, supra note 2, at 583.
Estates-Murder of an Ancestor-In re Bobula's Estate, 19 N.Y.2d 818, 227
N.E.2d 49, 280 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1967).
John Bobula shot and killed his wife and then committed suicide by shooting him-
self. Since the surrogate's court determined that the Bobulas had died simultaneously,
their joint savings account was distributed in accordance with the provisions of the
New York Decedent Estate Law1 which divided the jointly owned property equally,
one share going to each estate.2 The executrix of the wife's estate appealed to the
1. N.Y. DacEn. Esr. LAw § 89 (McKinney 1949).
2. In re Bobula's Estate, 45 Misc. 2d 745, 257 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Sur. Ct. 1965).
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New York Supreme Court which reversed and remanded, directing that the proceeds
of the joint bank account should be considered assets of the estate of the deceased
wife.3 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held: The matter should be
remanded to surrogate's court to determine whether the killing occurred under cir-
cumstances that would exculpate the deceased husband from criminal liability and,
if it should be determined that he was legally insane and there could have been no
successful prosecution had he lived, then the property should be distributed as origi-
nally provided by the surrogate's court.4
The court of appeals' decision has ignored nearly 80 years of judicial precedent,
beginning with the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer.5 Under New York case law, one
who slew his ancestor was not allowed to inherit from his victim. The rule rested on
the common law maxim that "no man shall be permitted to profit by his
own wrong." "Wrong," as defined in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, "consists in the injury
done, and not commonly in the purpose or mental or physical capacity of the per-
son or agent doing it."6 (Emphasis added.) The court, in Bobula's Estate, however,
takes the mental capacity of the slayer into account as a circumstance which may
exculpate him from criminal liability. Relieved of criminal liability, he would be
permitted to share the subject property with his victim joint-tenant.
In England, the common law doctrine that forbade a person from profiting from
his own wrong was well settled. It originated in Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Association,7 in which a wife, who had been convicted of murdering her husband,
was not permitted to take as beneficiary of his insurance policy. Subsequently, this
public policy rule was applied to a variety of factual situations, including cases in
which the slayer claimed property either by intestate succession or under a will.8
In the United States, a split of authority on this subject arose with passage of de-
cedent estate statutes. One group of jurisdictions allowed the murderer to inherit,
despite the fact that this result often offended the courts' sense of justice. These de-
cisions rested on two bases.
First they hold that the slayer's right to share in the estate is statutory,
granted by the legislature in the decedent estate laws, and that the courts,
therefore, are powerless to defeat the killer's right by the application of
common-law principles which have been abrogated by the statutes. Secondly,
many courts have held that to deny the inheritance would be to work a for-
feiture of estate as an additional penalty for crime .. . forbidden ...by
the United States Constitution. 9
The second group of jurisdictions also complied with the decedent estate laws
by permitting the murderer to acquire the legal title to the property, but held that
equity designated him a constructive trustee for the heirs and next of kin of the de-
3. In re Bobula's Estate, 25 App. Div. 2d 241, 269 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1966).
4. In re Bobula's Estate, 19 N.Y.2d 818, 227 N.E.2d 49, 280 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1967).
5. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).
6. 3 BouviER's LAw DICTIONARY 3500 (8th ed. 1914).
7. [1892] 1 Q.B. 147.
8. Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 229, 243 (1942).
9. Note, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 491-92 (1956). See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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cedent, thereby preventing the killer from taking any beneficial interest in the prop-
erty descending to him from his victim. 10
The final group of jurisdictions ignored the legislative fiat and held that neither
legal nor equitable title passed to the killer. These courts based their decisions on
the fact that
at common law a murderer could derive no benefit from his crime; that the
statutes of descent and of distribution are largely efforts to declare the com-
mon law; that it could not have been contemplated by legislators that the
common law in this respect should be abrogated by the statutes of descent ....
These courts . . . say that . . . constitutional provisions are not infringed
because the title never vested at any time in the wrongdoer."
Although this split of authority still exists, it has become increasingly insignifi-
cant, since a substantial majority of American jurisdictions have resolved the dilem-
ma by enacting a statutory exception to the decedent estate law.12 This exception
generally prevents one who has willfully or feloniously caused the death of the de-
cedent from inheriting, or receiving in any other manner, any portion of the dece-
dent's property. Thus, these states have solved the quandary initiated by the passage
of the decedent estate laws, i.e., whether to prefer the public policy rule, insuring
a just result, or to obey the unambiguous command of the legislature.
A distinction is occasionally drawn between cases involving intestacy and those
involving a will. It is alleged that in the former title should vest because of the intes-
tate statute, but that in the latter it should not vest because no statute is involved.
It has been suggested that this distinction is unsubstantial because even the validity
of testamentary gifts depends on the statute of wills. 13 Since there are only a few
cases involving a slayer who was a beneficiary under the will, and none of them al-
lowed the slayer to take as beneficiary, 14 we would have to theorize that a court al-
lowing recovery would also rely on the conviction that the statutory pattern abro-
gates the common law.' 5
10. 26A C.J.S. Descent 6- Distribution § 47 (1956).
11. Note, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 745, 747 (1931).
12. ALAsKA STAT. § 13.10.130 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-230 (1947); CAL. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 258 (Deering 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-279 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 908 (1953) (dealing only with wife who kills hus-
band); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.31 (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 49 (a) (Smith-Hurd
1961) (limited to wills situations); IND. STAT. ANN. § 6-212 (1953) (convicted murderer
becomes a constructive trustee); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (1964); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-513 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (1963); LA. Civ. CODE art. 966 (1952) (deals
with one convicted of having killed, or attempting to kill); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (1947);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 479 (1957); NEB. R V. STAT. § 30-119 (1964); N.M. STAT. § 40A-2-10
(1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-4 (1966); N.D. GEN. CODE ANN. § 56-04-23 (1960); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2105.19 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., 84 § 231 (1952); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 111.060 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.6(c) (1950); S.C. CODE § 19-5 (1962);
S.D. CODE ch. 56.0502 (1939) (neither the slayer nor anyone claiming through him shall
acquire any portion of the estate); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-109 (1955); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. § 41 (Vernon's 1955) (restricted to convicted murderer who is the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy or contract); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953); VA. CODE § 64-18 (1950);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.84.020-060 (1967); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-2 (1966); Wyo. STAT. § 2-
46 (1957).
13. Supra note 11, at 747-48.
14. Supra note 9, at 493 nA6.
15. Supra note 9, at 495.
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However, as in the Bobula case,
[w]here the tenancy is joint and there are rights of survivorship, the problem
becomes acute. This question is not one of succession, though it is reasonable
to expect that a court will follow here its general position on the matter of
the slayer's right to take by descent or will from his victim.1 6
What, then, is New York's position on these two matters?
The New York position was developed in 1889, in Riggs v. Palmer, where a 16-
year-old grandchild poisoned his grandfather to prevent him from cutting the boy
out of his will. The plaintiffs, daughters of the murdered man, brought suit to have
the provisions in the will providing for the grandchild set aside. The court of ap-
peals, in a 5-2 decision, affirmed a judgment in the daughters' favor, reasoning that
the legislature had actually intended to incorporate the old common-law maxim that
prevents a man from profiting by his own wrong as an exception in the Decedent
Estate Law.17 The court, speaking of the legislature which drafted the law, stated
that "it never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the tes-
tator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it."'18 This initiated
New York's common law exception to its Decedent Estate Law, including both tes-
tate and intestate situations.
Seven years later, the Riggs case was clarified in Ellerson v. Westcott19 in which
the plaintiff, seeking to profit in an action for partition, alleged that the devise was
void because the defendant-devisee killed the testator. The court explained that the
Riggs decision did not render the devise void as to the defendant, but rather author-
ized a court of equity to "intervene and deprive her of the benefit of the devise.' 20
In 1929, the New York legislature generally amended Article 3 of the Decedent
Estate Law respecting descent and distribution.21 In Sparks' Estate,22 a 1939 case, the
court posited that the legislature in amending "must be deemed to have dealt with
the rights of a surviving spouse with knowledge of the fundamental limitations ex-
pressed in Riggs v. Palmer," that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own
wrong or acquire property by his own crime, as by killing his wife.28
The Riggs doctrine has been expanded from its initial stages, when it simply ap-
plied to a devisee, to include a variety of situations. An individual contracting with
another, upon the express condition that the other survives him, is not permitted to
assert the failure of condition if he is the one who willfully caused that failure.24 A
remainderman is not permitted to realize the enjoyment of the estate if he has mur-
dered the life tenant to achieve such result.25 Where a husband and wife hold
property by the entireties, and the husband kills his wife and then commits suicide,
legally making him the survivor, the surviving tenant's estate has no right to the
16. T. ATKINSON, WILLS 156 (2d ed. 1953).
17. Riggs v. Palmer, supra note 5.
18. Id. at 509, 22 N.E. at 189.
19. 148 N.Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540 (1896).
20. Id. at 154, 42 N.E. at 542.
21. N.Y. DEcED. EST. LAw art. 3, amended by L.1929, ch. 229, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1930.
22. 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
23. Id. at 645, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
24. See Logan v. Whitley, 129 App. Div. 666, 114 N.Y.S. 255 (1908).
25. See In re Fleming, 16 Misc. 442, 38 N.Y.S. 611 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
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property.26 Finally, a beneficiary of an insurance policy who kills the insured is pre-
vented from taking the proceeds of the policy. 27
Other cases have also expanded the doctrine. In a decision which would appear
to be good authority for the principal case, a husband and wife held certain real
estate as joint tenants. The husband beat and strangled the wife and then commit-
ted suicide; the court decided the deaths were simultaneous. Emphasizing the pub-
lic policy rule of Riggs, and ignoring the fact that the husband could not be con-
victed of murder and, therefore, could not be adjudged criminally liable for his
wife's death, the court held that the real estate held by them as joint tenants passed
entirely to the estate of the wife.28 In a different factual situation, the court reaffirm-
ed this expansion of Riggs doctrine by again putting the emphasis on the wrong-
ful nature of the act, rather than on any criminal responsibility for the killing.29 It
also has been established that a husband who kills his wife and is convicted of first80
or second 8' degree manslaughter is barred from inheriting any portion of her estate.
The previous cases explain the total and exact significance of the Riggs doctrine
as it now exists. If the court had applied it to Bobula, the question would not have
been "whether John Bobula was criminally liable for his wife's death, but rather
whether he perpetrated a wrong upon her in taking her life." 82 The answer would
have been: "Whether it be called 'murder', 'manslaughter', or other felonious act,
or simply homicide, John Bobula committed a wrongful act upon his wife causing
her death, and neither he nor his estate should be allowed as a result to succeed to
his inchoate interest in their jointly held assets."8 8 Why, then, did the court not reach
this decision?
A case which is factually the same as the Bobula case, In re Santourian's Estate,8 4
suggests the answer. There, husband and wife held assets in a joint bank account
with the right of survivorship. The husband killed the wife and thus became en-
titled by statute to the entire bank account as the survivor. Surrogate Wagner held
that "[iut would be abhorrent to all the rules of equity and justice to permit this mur-
derer to retain title to this money under the circumstances .... I am opposed to
subscribing to any doctrine of law that will offer a premium to husbands to kill their
wives."8 5 The court showed no reluctance in ignoring the unambiguous language
of the New York Banking Law,86 which provided that the survivor take in the pre-
ceeding situation, and of applying the established law of the Riggs case. If, con-
trary to legislative intent, this court would not allow the survivor to take, why did
the Bobula court, faced with practically the same situation, reach a contrary decision?
The answer to this question may rest on the questionable authority of two New
26. See Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
27. See Mackowiak v. Polish Union of America, 236 App. Div. 44, 258 N.Y.S. 134 (1932).
28. See Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (1935).
29. See In re Sengillo's Estate, 206 Misc. 751, 134 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
30. See In re Sparks' Estate, supra note 22.
31. See In re Drewes' Estate, 206 Misc. 940, 136 N.Y.S.2d 72 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
32. In re Bobula's Estate, 19 N.Y.2d 818, 820, 227 N.E.2d 49, 51, 280 N.Y.S.2d 152, 154
(1967) (dissenting opinion).
33. Ibid.
34. 125 Misc. 668, 212 N.Y.S. 116 (Sur. Ct. 1925).
35. Id. at 670, 212 N.Y.S. at 118.
36. N.Y. BANK. LAw § 239 (3), (McKinney 1950).
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York decisions which have permitted a slayer to recover from his victim. In In re
WolfA87 the decedent was killed by her husband; he had intended, however, to shoot
her paramour. The husband, although convicted of first degree manslaughter, was
allowed to take his intestate share of his wife's estate. Surrogate Fowler stated that
the peculiar facts permitted him to conclude that "in equity" the defendant "ought
not to be barred from a succession under the statute of distributions, because he had
not the slightest intention of killing his wife and profiting by her death, which is the
very essence of the equitable bar, as I see it."38 In re Eckardt's Estate39 presents the
case of a wife who killed her husband while in a state of somnambulism. The court
allowed her to share in her husband's estate and also to become sole owner of realty
owned as tenants by the entirety, because "legally the wife committed no wrong, not
knowing at the time the nature and quality of her act...."40 Although these two cases
dealing with the killer's intention might appear to support the decision in Bobula,
this conclusion cannot be substantiated.
The real basis for the decision appears to be the influential holdings of a majority
of the courts which refuse to "interfere with the statutory order" of a "clear and
unambiguous statute of descents containing no exceptions" based on the criterion
that "there is no warrant for reading exceptions into a clearly worded statute .... ,41
These courts also have "refused to engraft the exception on the statutes ... upon the
expressed reason that they did not have the power to change a statute." 42 In these
states, the legislatures must provide the remedy by enacting an exception to their
decedent estate laws.43
The New York courts have traditionally felt that they could disregard the unambig-
uous language of the Decedent Estate Law and have engrafted a public policy ex-
ception on the statute by means of a process called "rational interpretation." Justice
Earl, speaking for the court in the Riggs case, explained:
It was the intention of the law-makers that the donees in a will should have
the property given to them. But it never could have been their intention that
a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should have
any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to their minds, and it
had been supposed necessary to make some provision of law to meet it, it
cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it. It is a familiar canon
of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers
of a statute is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter ... *
The writers of laws do not always express their intention perfectly, but either
exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from probable or
rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation. 44
This reasoning found few supporters. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Wall v.
37. 88 Misc. 453, 150 N.Y.S. 738 (Sur. Ct. 1914). For criticism of this decision, see In re
Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
38. Id. at 438, 150 N.Y.S. at 743.
39. 184 Misc. 748, 54 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Sur. Ct. 1945).
40. Id. at 754, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
41. Note, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 97-98 (1934).
42. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49
HARV. L. REv. 715, 716 (1936).
43. See Note, 33 MIcH. L. RYv. 446-47 (1934).
44. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 509, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (1889).
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Pfanschmidt,45 speaking of the rule that passes legal title to the murderer and allows
retention in spite of his crime, agreed that:
This rule finds its inception in the theory that the public policy of a state is
the law of that state as found in its Constitution, its statutory enactments,
and its judicial records; and where the intestate law casts the estate of a
deceased person upon designated persons this is absolute and peremptory,
and no rule of public policy can take it from the persons designated by stat-
ute and give it to others, even for the reason that the designated person
killed the intestate, without a violation of the statute. 46
It could be argued that the court in Bobula is simply attempting to produce an equi-
table result by delving into the question of insanity. It was not even alleged, however,
that John Bobula might have been insane. Furthermore, it would be difficult if not
impossible for any court, and especially a surrogate's court, to determine the sanity
of a dead man.
It is likely that the court, faced with the choice between the legislative command
of the statute-which allows a killer to take from his victim by inheritance or by right
of survivorship-and the common law rule of fairness-which prevents the wrongdoer
from profiting from his acts-wishes to show preference for the clear command of the
Decedent Estate Law; this, without outraging public opinion by permitting a killer to
profit by his deed. By turning to the insanity issue, adverse public opinion is avoided.
The only positive solution to the problem is the enactment of a New York statute
similar to those of other jurisdictions,47 which would provide an express exception to
the Decedent Estate Law. A good example is provided by the Mississippi statute:
If any person willfully cause or procure the death of another in any way, he
shall not inherit the property, real or personal, or such other; but the same
shall descend as if the person so causing or procuring the death had never
been in being.48
The New York statute, however, must be broad enough to provide that neither
the slayer of another, nor the slayer's estate, shall take any portion of the decedent's
estate by devise, descent, distribution, survivorship, or by any other manner. Further,
the statute should be constructed with emphasis on the situation created by a "will-
ful, unlawful slaying" rather than looking to a judicial determination of the wrong-
45. 265 Ill. 180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914).
46. Id. at 189, 106 N.E. at 788. In Deem v. Millikin, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 351 (1892), the court
criticized New York's position, quoting from F. WARTON, HOMICIDE § 667 (3d ed.), in the
following language:
"Knowledge of the settled maxims and principles of statutory interpretations is imputed
to the legislature. To the end that there may be certainty and uniformity in legal ad-
ministration, it must be assumed that statutes are enacted with a view to their inter-
pretation according to such maxims and principles. When they are regarded, the legis-
lative intent is ascertained. When they are ignored, interpretation becomes legislation
in disguise. The well considered cases warrant the pertinent conclusion that when the
legislature, not transcending the limits of its power, speaks in clear language upon a
question of policy, it becomes the judicial tribunals to remain silent.... The decision
in Riggs v. Palmer is the manifest assertion of a wisdom believed to be superior to that
of the legislature upon a question of policy."
47. See supra note 12.
48. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 479 (1957).
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doer's status as a "murderer." Such legislation would enable the New York courts to
turn to the Decedent Estate Law-with its built-in exception-rather than rely on
judicial legislation in a case such as Bobula. The result would be to grant the entire
bank account to the estate of the wife, a result both founded on statute and equi-
tably sound.
Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practice-Polling-Struksnes Construction Co.,
165 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (June 26, 1967).
The National Labor Relations Board issued a decision finding inter alia that re-
spondent had not committed unfair labor practices under Section 8 (a) (1) and (5)
of the National Labor Relations Act' by conducting a poll of employees following a
majority claim and consequently refusing a bargaining demand by Operating Engi-
neers Local 49. Reversing the trial examiner, the Board found the poll lawful be-
cause: The sole purpose of the poll was to ascertain whether the union represented
a current majority; employees were assured against reprisals; the evidence failed to
establish that employees answered untruthfully and even if their answers were not
truthful, such answers did not result from threats of reprisal; and the polling oc-
curred in a background free from hostility toward the union. The Board found no
bargaining violation since the general counsel had failed to establish that respondent's
expressed doubt of the union's majority was not made in good faith. 2
As aggrieved party, the union sought review of the Board's decision and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, noting
the possible inherent restraint resulting from the polling of employees by an em-
ployer. It remanded the case to the Board for further consideration, urging the
1. Section 8 (a) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Sec-
tion 7] ... (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of [Section 9 (a)]." 49 Stat. 452-53 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (1),(5) (1964).
Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in [Section 8 (a) (3)].
49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
2. Struksnes Constr. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1368 (1964). Member Gerald Brown, dissenting,
would have found the poll unlawful because respondent had not questioned the union's
majority status, the poll's purpose was not to verify the union's majority status, the trial
examiner found no assurances against reprisals, the poll was conducted in a questionable
manner, and a lack of secrecy caused employees to answer untruthfully and thereby de-




Board to "... come to grips with this constantly recurring problem... [and] outline
at least minimal standards to govern the ascertainment of union status ... ."a In
accordance with the remand, the full Board unanimously decided to revise prior
polling standards and held:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer
will be violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act unless the following safe-
guards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth
of a union's claim of majority, (2) this purpose is communicated to the em-
ployees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4) the employees are
polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair
labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere.
4
While holding that unless the foregoing safeguards are observed an unfair practice
will be found, the Board indicated that in accord with other "presumptive rules,"
observance of the Struksnes criteria will not establish conclusively that the poll was
lawful, but only creates a rebuttable presumption.5 With respect to the instant case,
the Board dismissed the polling allegation of the complaint after noting that, under
the new rule it was enunciating, the poll probably would be found ublawful.6
Polling may be characterized as the systematic interrogation of employees by an
employer and may be used for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of a union's
claim of majority status. 7 As noted by the Board in Struksnes, there are several ap-
proved and uncoercive alternatives available to an employer faced with such a claim.
He may request proof of majority status,s request that the union file a representa-
tion petition or file one himself as provided for under Section 9 (c),9 submit any
such claim based on union authorization cards to an impartial third party for a card
check,' 0 or, assuming a good faith doubt, simply refuse recognition and do nothing."1
3. Operating Engineers, Local 49 v. NLRB, 353 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
4. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 102, at 4 (June 26, 1967).
5. The Board noted that the adoption of the revised rule was "[i]n accord with presump-
tive rules applied by the Board with court approval in other situations...." Struksnes
Constr. Co., supra note 4, at 5. Other examples of Board presumptive rules are cited in
NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346, 349 (2d Cir. 1965).
6. In view of the respondent's failure to inform employees of the purpose of the poll and
the failure to observe the newly enunciated secrecy requirements, the Board declared that
"the Respondent's conduct would probably be found unlawful if this case were now before
us for an initial determination under the new rule." Struksnes Constr. Co., supra note 4,
at 6. However, in light of the "special circumstances" present, i.e., the poll previously being
found lawful by the Board and the work at the job site where the poll was taken being
scheduled for completion shortly, the Board decided that no remedial order was warranted
and thus dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
7. Prior to the instant case, there appeared to be no technical distinction between polling
and interrogation, and the tests for determining the unlawfulness of the latter were equally
applicable to the former. See A.L. Gilbert Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 2067, 2072 (1954). See also
the discussion on polling and interrogation in 26 NLRB ANN. REP. 78-79 (1961).
8. See, e.g., Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); KTRH Broadcasting Co., 113
N.L.R.B. 125 (1955); Walmac Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1953).
9. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 103, 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (c) (1964).
10. See, e.g., Snow & Sons v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), enforcing 134 N.L.R.B.
709 (1961); Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 861 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Aaron Bros., supra note 8; Hammond & Irving, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1071
(1965); Gary Steel Prods. Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1963).
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In addition, he can conduct a poll which, if it discloses a lack of majority, will fur-
nish grounds for a good faith doubt of the majority claim and a lawful reason to re-
fuse recognition.12 In Struksnes, for example, the employer successfully defended
refusal-to-bargain allegations when he had refused recognition after conducting a poll
disclosing the absence of such a majority. It is arguable that the union's claim was
based on a card majority which, had there been no polling yielding the employer a
convenient and effective defense to the bargaining charges, might have resulted in a
finding of a bargaining violation warranting a bargaining order.13
Prior to Struksnes, the Board had established a comprehensive test of polling in
Blue Flash Express, Inc.14 by declaring: "[T]he test is whether, under all the circum-
stances, the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain or interfere with the employees
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act." 15 There, after receiving a letter from
the union alleging that it represented a majority of his employees and demanding
recognition, the employer in turn polled each employee for the purpose of establish-
ing the truth of the claim and preparing an answer. In conducting the poll, the em-
ployer assured employees that they need not fear reprisals as a result of their replies.
Reversing the earlier view that interrogation or polling was unlawful per se,16 a
Board majority held that such interrogation was not unlawful. However, the Board
noted: (I) The purpose of the poll was to determine the truth or validity of the
union's majority claim; (2) this purpose was communicated to employees; (3) em-
ployees were assured against reprisals; and (4) the polling occurred in a background
free of employer hostility to union organization.' 7
Notwithstanding the fact that the Board set forth four guidelines in Blue Flash
in reaching its result in that case, the rule enunciated was a sweeping one calling for
consideration of "all the circumstances" relevant to the issue and for consideration
of each case on its merits. As a result, subsequent cases decided by the Board and the
circuit courts failed to establish a set rule or a series of guidelines which safely could
be applied by an employer faced with a union majority claim.' 8 However, while there
is an acknowledged difficulty in generalizing in this area, 19 two opposing approaches
traceable to Blue Flash appear to have emerged in intervening cases handed down
by the Board and the courts.
Instructive of one approach was the opinion of the second circuit in Bourne Co.
12. See, e.g., Briggs IGA Foodliner, 146 N.L.R.B. 443 (1964); Cameo Lingerie, Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 535 (1964); Suburban Drugs, Inc., 138 N.L.R.B. 787 (1962).
13. See Member Brown's dissent to the Board's original dismissal of the complaint in
Struksnes Constr. Co., supra note 2, at 1372.
14. 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
15. Id. at 593.
16. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949). The per se doctrine was
rather consistently rejected by the courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Protein Blenders, Inc., 215
F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1954), and cases cited therein. For an analysis of the rationale which led
the courts to reverse the Board in Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., supra, and direct the Board's
attention to the frequent conflict of legitimate interests which required balancing, see Gen-
eral Indus., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1608, 1614-17 (1958).
17. Blue Flash Express, Inc., supra note 14, at 593-94.
18. Struksnes Constr. Co., supra note 4, at 3-4; NLRB v. Lorben Corp., supra note 5,
at 348.
19. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 107 (1964).
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v. NLRB. 20 Reversing the Board, the court approved the employer's polling after
noting that there was no pattern of employer hostility and discrimination, the infor-
mation sought by the employer was of a general nature, the principal interrogation
was conducted by low ranking supervisors, the employees were questioned on an in-
formal basis, and the replies generally were truthful.21 It appears that in Bourne the
second circuit fashioned its own rule in developing a test or identifying the relevant
circumstances which should be considered in deciding whether interrogation or a
poll was an unfair labor practice. In reaching the above result, Bourne sets forth the
following factors as relevant:
(1) The background, i.e. is there a history of employer hostility and dis-
crimination?
(2) The nature of the information sought, e.g. did the interrogator appear
to be seeking information on which to base taking action against individual
employees?
(3) The identity of the questioner, i.e. how high was he in the company
hierarchy?
(4) Place and method of interrogation, e.g. was employee called from work
to the boss's office? Was there an atmosphere of "unnatural formality"?
(5) Truthfulness of the reply.22
The second circuit was but expanding on the factors listed in an earlier decision 23
by the same court and cited in Bourne. The earlier decision, referring to the com-
prehensive approach of Blue Flash, asserted that the most relevant factors were
whether there was a background of employer hostility to and discrimination against
the union, and whether the questions appeared to seek information which the em-
ployer in good faith needed.24 Other factors deemed relevant were added and reap-
peared in Bourne. However, the court's opinion in Bourne neither posited any one
factor as most relevant nor clearly indicated the weight which should be assigned to
the ones listed.
Instructive of the second approach was the decision by the Board in Johnnie's
Poultry CO.25 In that case, an employer who conducted employee interviews relating
to union matters defended polling his employees on two grounds: First, to deter-
mine whether the union was in fact the majority representative, which would war-
rant settlement of the charges by extending recognition in the event the union had
a valid claim; and second, in the event that no settlement was reached, to ascertain
the facts surrounding the alleged unlawful refusal to bargain in order to prepare a
defense to a complaint, should one issue. It was shown that the polls were conducted
on an individual basis by the respondent's attorneys, and at the outset of each inter-
view the employee was informed of the twofold purpose of the poll and that no re-
prisals would result because of his answers. However, the evidence also established
that the interviewers sought information relating to statements given by employees
20. 332 F2d 47 (2d Cir. 1964), modifying 144 N.L.R.B. 805 (1963).
21. Id. at 48.
22. Ibid.
23. NLRB v. Firedoor Corp. of America, 291 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1961), enforcing 127 N.L.R.B.
1123 (1960).
24. Id. at 331.
25. 146 N.L.R.B. 770 (1964), rev'd, 844 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1965).
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to Board agents and inquired about where union meetings were held and the em-
ployees present at such meetings.
While acknowledging the "inherent danger of coercion" in interrogation and
polling, the Board declared that an employer may exercise the privilege of interro-
gating or polling employees for either one of two legitimate purposes: (1) verifica-
tion of a union's asserted majority status in order to determine if recognition should
be granted, or (2) the investigation of facts concerning issues raised in a complaint
where the interrogation is necessary to prepare a defense.20 Since the employer's at-
torneys failed to confine their inquiries to matters integrally related to the union's
majority or the preparation of a defense, the Board held that the interviews ex-
ceeded the permissible limits and a violation was found.
In setting forth the principles governing the privilege, the Board wrote:
In allowing an employer the privilege of ascertaining the necessary facts
from employees in these given circumstances, the Board and courts have es-
tablished specific safeguards designed to minimize the coercive impact of
such employer interrogation. Thus, the employer must communicate to the
employee the purpose of the questioning, assure him that no reprisal will
take place, and obtain his participation on a voluntary basis; the question-
ing must occur in a context free from employer hostility to union organiza-
tion and must not be itself coercive in nature; and the questions must not
exceed the necessities of the legitimate purpose by prying into other union
matters, eliciting information concerning an employee's subjective state of
mind, or otherwise interfering with the statutory rights of employees.
When an employer transgresses the boundaries of these safeguards, he loses
the benefits of the privilege.27
To be sure, the "specific safeguards" which are to be found in Johnnie's Poultry,
i.e., legitimate purpose, communication of the purpose to employees, assurances
against reprisals, and a context free from employer hostility to union organization,
are readily traceable to the four relevant circumstances upon which the Board based
its decision in Blue Flash. However, in light of an unmistakable emphasis on spe-
cific safeguards which an employer must observe before polling his employees, along
with the notable absence of the comprehensive language of Blue Flash, Johnnie's
Poultry represents a second approach by which the Board itself appears to have
shifted its position on polling.28
In Struksnes, by requiring observance of a set of clearly defined safeguards rather
than a comprehensive test encompassing various relevant circumstances, the Board
elected to fashion a revised rule closely modeled after the approach in Johnnie's
Poultry. Moreover, by adding the secrecy requirement, the revised rule established a
further safeguard which will tend to limit employee coercion and unreliable polls.
As the Board itself observed in the instant case, without the strong safeguards that
26. That an employer is permitted under certain circumstances to interrogate employees
where the information is needed as evidence in litigation is well-settled. See Joy Silk Mills,
Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732. (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U.S. 914 (1951).
27. Johnnie's Poultry Co., supra note 25, at 775.
28. See NLRB v. Lorben Corp., supra note 5, at 348. Compare Blue Flash Express, Inc.,
supra note 14, with Johnnie's Poultry Co., supra note 25, Frank Sullivan & Co., 133 N.L.R.B.
726 (1961) and Orkin Exterminating Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 399 (1962).
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were adopted, there is a danger of coercion and fear of reprisal, and the chance that
an unreliable poll will result which would enable an employer to deny recognition
and evade a legitimate bargaining obligation. Mindful of these dangers, Struksnes
adopts such strong safeguards to protect employee rights and organizational activi-
ties as guaranteed under the Act.
The Struksnes revision also represents a timely and decisive move on the part of
the Board to eliminate the uncertainty arising from opposing approaches by both
the Board and the circuit courts to the question of polling. In addition, beyond the
inestimable value of clarification, 29 it should be noted that the revised rule allows for
simple yet flexible application because of its presumptive nature. Considering all its
qualities, therefore, Struksnes should produce greater use and reliance on polling,80
the issuance of fewer complaints alleging bargaining violations when the safeguards
have been observed, more distinct grounds for finding a bargaining violation where
a poll discloses a union majority and recognition is not granted, and a greater likeli-
hood on the part of an employer to grant recognition when a poll reveals a union
majority. 31
29. See Note, Employer May Violate § 8 (a) (1) in Attempting To Ascertain Union Majority
Status, 41 NoTRE DAME LAW. 579 (1966).
30. In light of the problems the Board has been confronted with regarding union au-
thorization cards, it would seem that the Board would want to encourage polling to the
extent it represents a simple and less troublesome alternative by which a union can estab-
lish a majority claim. Regarding some of the problems involving the use of authorization
cards, see generally Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without An NLRB Elec-
tion, 65 MicH. L. REv. 851 (1967).
31. See generally Bok, supra note 19, at 106-12.
Landlord and Tenant-Judicial Sale as an Event Giving Operation to Lessee's
Right of First Refusal-Cities Service Oil Co. v. Estes, -Va. -, 155 S.E.2d 59
(1967).
This case of first impression in the courts of Virginia deals with a situation upon
which only three American courts and one Canadian court have passed. The con-
troversy arose from a recorded lease, wherein 0. H. Mull and his wife leased prop-
erty to Cities Service Oil Co. for use as a gasoline station. The term of the lease was
15 years, with an option to renew for another 5 years. The first portion of section 13
of the lease gave Cities Service an option to purchase the land during the term of the
lease for $45,000. The second portion of this section gave Cities Service a right of
first refusal, reading in part:
In the event that the Landlord at any time during the ... term hereof
shall receive a bona fide offer ... for the sale of ... [these] premises ... the
Landlord shall give the Tenant written notice of the terms and conditions
of any said offer and the Tenant shall have the option and first refusal for
thirty days after receipt of such notice within which to elect to purchase...
on terms of such offer. If Tenant shall elect to purchase ... it shall give writ-
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ten notice . . . within such thirty day period .... [T]he Landlord shall de-
liver.., a full covenant warranty deed ... 1
0. H. Mull died intestate in 1962, and the property passed to his wife, who remar-
ried, and to his five children. In 1965, the wife, now Mrs. Bagley, filed a bill praying,
inter alia, for a decree authorizing and directing a sale of the property leased by
Cities Service, subject to the provisions of the lease. The proposed sale was approved,
and notices of the sale were published, stating that the sale was to be subject to the
provisions of the recorded lease. In a "well attended and . . . spirited" sale, C. E.
Estes, the defendant, made the last and highest bid of $31,100.
Cities Service, which had not been made a party to the action authorizing the sale,
then filed a petition asserting its rights under the second portion of section 13 of the
lease, asking that the sale not be confirmed until it chose whether to exercise its right
of first refusal. Within the thirty day period, Cities Service notified all parties in in-
terest and the court that it would exercise this right. The chancellor was of the opin-
ion that the option to purchase for $45,000, contained in the first portion of section
13, gave Cities Service adequate protection. He held that a judicial sale was not an
event that rendered the right of first refusal operable, even though the provisions of
section 13 ran with the land and were binding upon the heirs. Cities Service
appealed.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed, reasoning that the insertion
of the right of first refusal was for the benefit of Cities Service. 2 The court found that,
since Cities Service had insisted upon the right of first refusal in addition to the op-
tion, the option itself could not be construed as providing adequate protection. Estes
objected that permitting exercise of the right of first refusal would depress the bid-
ding at auction. The court replied that this result was not necessary, since Cities
Service was not bound to exercise its right.8 Estes then argued that the parties to the
lease had not contemplated a judicial sale, since such sale would result in the giving
of a special warranty deed, rather than the general warranty deed required by the
lease. The court answered that the provision of the lease requiring the general war-
ranty deed was inserted to protect Cities Service. As such, this requirement did not
manifest an intent to exclude judicial sales, and Cities Service, as the beneficiary of
the clause, might waive its protection and accept the lesser deed.
The four cases that have previously decided whether a judicial sale gives opera-
tion to a right of first refusal are equally divided. Price v. Town of Ruston4 provides
the strongest support for the Cities Service decision. There, Arilla Price, whose heirs
were the plaintiffs, granted the local Elks lodge permission to build a third floor ad-
dition atop her building. The Elks were to pay for constructing these premises, and
were to have their rent-free use. Mrs. Price, her heirs, assigns, and successors in in-
terest were to be given the "option and preference" of purchasing the addition for
the price at which it should be offered to the public in the event that the Elks de-
l. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Estes, - Va. -, 155 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1967).
2. Id. at 63. See, e.g., Holt v. Stofflet, 384 Mich. 272, 54 N.W.2d 593, rehearing denied, 334
Mich. 272, 55 N.W.2d 170 (1952).
3. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Estes, supra note 1, at 64.
4. 171 La. 985, 132 So. 653 (1931).
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sired to sell. Subsequently, the Elks became bankrupt and were forced to sell the ad-
dition. The Town of Ruston, the defendant in this action, purchased the third floor
at public auction. The plaintiffs then asserted their rights under the contract with
the Elks, and tendered the sale price to the court. The court held for the plaintiff.
Even more strongly than in Cities Service, the Louisiana court was impressed by
the fact that the clause giving the right of first refusal was inserted for the benefit
of the plaintiffs. It had no difficulty in finding that Mrs. Price had permitted the
building of the third floor addition as an act of benevolence towards the Elks, and
that the option clause had been inserted in the contract to prevent other parties, to
whom the Elks might sell, from having the premises rent free. As in Cities Service,
the court was unimpressed with the argument that to permit the exercise of the op-
tion under the circumstance of a forced sale would depress the bidding. In answer to
this objection, the court stated:
It is suggested that the interpretation which the district judge has given
to the clause in question made it utterly useless and unavailing for anyone
except the Price heirs to bid on the property at the sheriff's offering of it for
sale; but that is not quite correct, because the Price heirs were not bound
to take the property at the highest price bid, and would not have taken it if
the price had not been satisfactory to them.5
The Virginia court relied heavily upon the foregoing.
As indicated by the opinion in Cities Service, Estes never argued that the only way
in which Cities Service could have the property was to make the highest bid. But this
argument was considered in Price:
That construction of the option would make it worthless in case of a forced
sale; because regardless of the contract, Mrs. Price and her heirs and assigns
had the right, in common with every body [sic] else, to make the last and
highest bid for the property at a forced sale.6
The Virginia court also relied upon McCarter v. York County Loan Co.,7 but that
decision is not strong support for Cities Service. McCarter had leased a dwelling
house from defendant. The lease provided that McCarter should have a right of first
5. Id. at 992, 132 So. at 656.
6. Price v. Town of Ruston, supra note 4, at 991-92, 132 So. at 656.
This decision was not the end of the case. See Price v. Town of Ruston, 19 La. App. 356,
139 So. 55 (1932), where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana held that the
Price heirs could recover the loss of rental value of the premises for the period that the
Town of Ruston had held over after the Price heirs' tendered money in assertion of the
right of first refusal. Despite this holding, the Price heirs were (in the same opinion) non-
suited on the ground that the damages were too speculative. The lower court also had
found that the Town of Ruston could not set off the cost of repairs made during the hold-
over period, which decision was not appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined
review of the non-suit, and the Price heirs quickly returned to the lower courts, armed
with witnesses as to the fair rental value of the premises. This time, they recovered about
$1,625. On appeal, the court sustained the recovery; but on discovering that the Price heirs,
in asserting the option, had tendered a check rather than cash to the court, recovery was
reduced by two years' interest on -the tendered amount to $1,326.66. 148 So. 512 (La. Ct.
App. 1933). On rehearing, this was further reduced to $663.33. 151 So. 133 (La. Ct. App.
1933). An application for another rehearing was quickly dismissed. 151 So. 664 (La. Ct.
App. 1933). As to further battles between these litigants, the reports are silent.
7. 14 Ont. L.R. 420 (1907).
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refusal if the lessor should receive an offer for the property during the term of the
lease. Subsequently, the loan company was declared insolvent, and a liquidator was
appointed. He sold the house without giving McCarter an opportunity to exercise
his option. McCarter sued for damages and was awarded judgment, the court find-
ing that the liquidator could sell only within the provisions of the lease, and that he
was required to submit the offer to McCarter, even though McCarter knew that the
house was being sold and did not assert his rights before the sale. Since this case did
not involve the assertion of rights to set aside a sale, but was a suit for damages, it is
not clear that the case is in point. But it is so used by the Virginia court; it is un-
fortunate that it is done in such a fashion as to appear to be an assertion of a right
of first refusal against a purchaser, rather than as a suit for damages.8 Since, how-
ever, the Ontario court found that the liquidation order did not affect McCarter's
rights under the lease, there is some reason to believe that in a suit similar to that
in Cities Service, he might have recovered judgment.
In re Rigby's Estate9 involved a lease that provided that plaintiff would have the
right to purchase the leased land at such price as the lessor "shall then demand."
During the term of the lease the lessor died, and the land was sold at public auction
by his administrator in order to settle the estate. In a suit by the plaintiff-lessee
against the purchaser, judgment was given for the purchaser, and the lessee ap-
pealed. The court found that the right of first refusal ran with the land and was
binding on the heirs. By statute, the administrator was not the agent of the heirs; 10
as such, he did not sell with their consent. Since he lacked the authority of the heirs,
the administrator did not fix the price demanded, as was required to bring the sale
within the terms of the lease, thus giving operation to the right of first refusal."
Without the authority of the owners, the court decided, the administrator could only
sell the land subject to the covenant in the lease, which ran with the land. Thus, if
the purchaser decided to sell the land during the term of the lease, plaintiff-lessee
would then be permitted to exercise his right of first refusal. After stating the fore-
going, the court set the sale aside for other reasons.
Rigby's Estate is readily distinguishable from Cities Service: in the former case, it
was an administrator who petitioned that the land be sold, and who subsequently
sold it without the authority of the heirs; whereas, in Cities Service, it was the heirs
themselves who were the petitioners.
A case reaching the same result as Rigby's Estate, but by different reasoning, is
Draper v. Gochman.12 Here, plaintiff was leased premises under an agreement pro-
viding a "first right of refusal" in the event that the owner "desires to sell." Later,
the owner mortgaged the property, and upon his default, it was sold to defendant
by the trustee at a foreclosure sale. Two years later, plaintiff asserted his right of re-
fusal under the lease. The lower court held that the suit was barred by laches. On ap-
8. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Estes, supra note 1, at 63.
9. 62 Wyo. 401, 167 P.2d 964 (1946).
10. Wyo. RFv. STAT. § 88-4001 (1931). See also Cook v. Elmore, 25 Wyo. 393, 171 P. 261
(1918).
11. In re Rigby's Estate, supra note 9, at 405, 167 P.2d at 968.
12. - Tex. - , 400 S.W.2d 545 (1966), reversing 389 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
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peal, this decision was reversed,' 3 the court finding that the plaintiff's right of refusal
could be asserted at any time during the term of the lease, and that the foreclosure
did not take the sale outside the words "desires to sell." On appeal to the Texas Su-
preme Court, the case was again reversed.' 4 The court held that "desires to sell" cov-
ered only a voluntary act, as distinguished from a foreclosure sale. The plaintiff ob-
jected that the trustee should not be able to do what the owner could not do-sell
the property free of plaintiff's rights. The court replied that the plaintiff could still
exercise these rights as to a sale by the defendant during the term of the lease. For
this reason, the court concluded that plaintiff's rights had been preserved.
Draper, like Rigby's Estate, can be distinguished from Cities Service. In Draper,
the sale was forced; in Cities Service, the sale was effectuated at the behest of the
heirs. More difficulty is encountered in distinguishing Price and McCarter from
Draper: all three cases involved forced sales, yet the last case reaches a different con-
dusion from the other two. Reconciliation is possible only by noting differences in
the circumstances of each case, rather than by dwelling on the forced sale element.
Thus, the court in Price relied heavily on the fact that only the Elks were intended
to have the premises rent-free, and was accordingly-and understandably-solicitous
of the plaintiff's interest, despite the fact of a forced sale. In McCarter, the court
vindicated the right of the plaintiff without reaching the question of whether a trans-
fer of the premises should be ordered; although it is suggested that, if consent by the
owner to the sale be the criterion, McCarter would not have been granted operation
of his right of first refusal had he prayed for this. In Draper, where there was a forced
sale with neither the special circumstances of the sort found in Price nor the necessity
of deciding whether to enforce a right of first refusal, the court was quick to find for
the defendant.
Another question is whether Draper would have been granted damages if he, like
McCarter, had asked for them. The answer would seem to be "no," inferable from
the fact that the court deemed Draper's rights adequately protected by his ability to
exercise the right of first refusal against the new owners of the land.
As noted in the preceding discussion, the cases are divided into two clear lines of
decision. Those courts which view the right of first refusal as a provision for the bene-
fit of the lessee find for the lessee, granting either conveyance of the land itself or dam-
ages. Courts which interpret the provision only as a covenant running with the land
(for the court in Cities Service found the same covenant, yet gave judgment for the
lessee) hold against the lessee, and let him exercise his right of first refusal against the
new owner. The weakness of the latter approach is that it renders the right of first re-
fusal virtually meaningless, since there is little chance that the new owner will wish
to sell during the term of the lease; that is, there is little likelihood of the lessee real-
izing the benefit of the right of first refusal for which he has bargained. Furthermore,
the seller, whose interest is solely financial, would not be damaged if the court were to
permit the right of first refusal to operate, since he would receive the same amount of
money regardless of who obtains the land. Finally, the approach is weak in that it
fails to recognize that the buyer, knowing that the sale is made subject to a right of
13. Draper v. Gochman, 389 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
14. Draper v. Gochman, supra note 12.
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first refusal, may be said to have bid knowing that there was a risk that he might not
receive the land even if he were the high bidder. Since the buyer knew of the risk, it
is difficult to understand why the courts in Draper and Rigby's Estate did not find that
he bid subject to the risk, and thus did not have standing to complain about the in-
vocation of the right of first refusal.
The former approach, that of Cities Service, is much stronger and certainly more
just. The seller, of course, is unaffected by the decision. The buyer, while losing the
land for which he had bid, knew that this risk was inherent in his bidding: it is fair
that since someone must bear the burden of loss, it should be he who had knowl-
edge. The lessee is permitted to exercise his right of first refusal against the seller,
rather than against a buyer who later decides to sell, if the buyer does make this de-
cision during the term of the lease. Thus, the right of refusal is not only given mean-
ing-while it is ignored in the other line of cases-but it operates upon the seller,
who arguably is the only person upon whom the parties to the lease intended it to
operate.
Based on the foregoing, it is suggested that the Virginia court, when confronted
with conflicting approaches, chose the better one. The opinion itself is weak, for the
court merely noted the four decisions discussed here, turning for support to Price
and McCarter, without discussing the issues raised by Rigby's Estate and Draper. As
such, Cities Service provides authority in this rare area of litigation; but it may only
be used in support of the lessee's case, rather than in resolving the case that will in-
evitably be made by the purchaser.
Principal and Surety-Government Contracts-Application of Payments-
Miller Act-United States ex rel. Hyland Electrical Supply Co. v. Franchi
Brothers Construction Corp., 378 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1967).
Franchi Brothers Construction Corp. (Franchi) entered into a construction contract
with the United States. Pursuant to the Miller Act,' Franchi furnished the United
States with a payment bond, naming itself as principal and Maryland Casualty Co.
as surety. This bond guaranteed payment in full to laborers and materialmen. Fair-
way Electrical Contractors, Inc. (Fairway), a subcontractor, purchased electrical
supplies for use on this job from Hyland Electrical Supply Co. (Hyland). Fairway was
already indebted to Hyland for materials unconnected with the Franchi subcontract.
Franchi was requested to make its payments in the form of checks payable to Fair-
way and Hyland jointly; he also was instructed to send the checks directly to Hyland.
Franchi instead sent two payments to Fairway, who then remitted them to Hyland
with instructions to apply part of them to the Franchi account and part to Fairway's
preexisting debts. Upon receiving the first payment, Hyland notified Franchi as to
how it was being applied. Franchi made objection, and sent a second check. Hyland
I. Ch. 642, 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270 (a)- (d) (1964).
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again gave notice to Franchi. When Fairway subsequently became insolvent and was
unable to pay Hyland for the balance of materials purchased for this job, Hyland
sued Franchi and its surety upon the bond. The trial court ruled in favor of Hyland
for the full balance. On appeal to the circuit court, it was held: Franchi was not es-
topped from denying liability because it received notice as to the application of its
checks.2
As a general rule, a payment from a debtor to a creditor may be applied to one of
several debts as the debtor intends and manifests to the creditor.8 If the debtor fails
to indicate his intention, the payment is applied as the creditor determines.4 In either
case, the application may be to a secured or unsecured debt and is binding upon
third persons. If the debtor, however, is under a duty to a third person to devote funds
paid by him to the discharge of a particular debt, the payment must be so applied if
the creditor knows or has reason to know of that duty; this is so despite the debtor's
contrary direction.5
This principle was held controlling in the Miller Act cases here discussed. The
factual situations in these cases are similar to that in Franchi. The creditor may
have applied the payments to an unsecured debt without the debtor's direction or
consent.6 The subcontractor may be indebted to the supplier for a personal loan,
rather than for materials purchased on a prior job.7 The prime contractor may be
the debtor of the supplier, who then attempts to hold the surety alone liable on the
bond.8 In each case, however, there is a debtor, a creditor, and a third person who has
a special equity in the funds.
The Supreme Court early established the right of laborers and materialmen of
subcontractors to recover from the principal and surety on the Miller Act payment
bond,9 although the subcontractor may have already been paid by the prime con-
tractor.10 But when the subcontractor forwards those payments to a supplier who
knows the source of the funds, and the money is applied to reduce other debts, a dif-
2. United States ex rel. Hyland Elec. Supply Co. v. Franchi Bros. Constr. Corp., 378 F.2d
134 (2d Cir. 1967).
3. See 40 AM. JUR. Payment § 110 (1942); 70 C.J.S. Payment § 52 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF
CONmACrS § 387 (a) (1932).
4. See 40 AM. JUR. Payment § 117 (1942); 70 C.J.S. Payment § 57 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 387 (a) (1932).
5. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 388 (1932). See also Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1297 (1926); Annot.,
130 A.L.R. 198 (1941); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 641 (1947); 72 C.J.S. Principal and Surety § 144
(1951).
6. United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Johnson, Smathers & Rollins, 67 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.
1933).
7. United States ex rel. Carroll v. Beck, 151 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1945).
8. United States v. American Bonding & Trust Co., 89 F. 925 (4th Cir. 1898). The supplier
in Franchi sued both the principal and the surety on the bond. Since there was no notice
given to the surety as to the application of the payments, however, the court summarily re-
jected the contention that the surety should also be held liable. This discussion will therefore
be limited to the liability of the prime contractor as principal on the bond and the effect of
the notice given him.
9. United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197 (1906).
10. Mankin v. United States ex rel. Ludowici-Celadon Co., 215 U.S. 533 (1910); accord,
Moyer v. United States ex rel. Trane Co., 206 F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1953); Smith v. Mosier, 169 F.
430 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1909); United States ex rel. Deacon Bros. v. Starrett Bros. & Eken, Inc.,
18 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
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ferent conclusion has consistently resulted.'" The reasoning set forth in United States
v. American Bonding & Trust Co.12 set the pattern of future decisions. In holding
that the plaintiffs-suppliers were bound to apply the payments to the indebtedness
arising under the government subcontract, the court stated:
To allow them to apply the money received from the government to a pre-
existing debt due them, and leave the surety on the government contract in
ignorance of the prevailing condition of affairs until after the contractors
had failed and made an assignment, would work a great hardship, if not re-
sult in an actual fraud, on defendant in error, and cannot be countenanced,
even if innocently done. 3 (Emphasis added.)
The court, however, inferred that, with knowledge of how the payments were being
applied, the surety could adequately have protected itself.' 4
R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co.15 affirmed the right of the prime
contractor to have his checks credited against the subcontract account in such cir-
cumstances. Thus, because of the "overriding equity of the situation"'1 in favor of
the prime contractor, the federal courts have held the creditor-supplier bound by an
equitable duty to apply payments to the secured debt, at least where the creditor-
supplier knows the source of the payments.1 7 A contrary result, requiring the prime
contractor to pay twice for the same labor or materials,' 8 would be neither just, in
view of his lack of knowledge concerning the application of payments, nor sound,
in view of the policy of the law to deter any conduct which works to the detriment
of a principal or surety on a bond.
In Franchi, there was an additional and distinguishable fact-the creditor-supplier
gave notice to the prime contractor as to how the payments were being applied.
Thus, the court was faced with this question: "What is there, if anything, in Hy-
land's notice to Franchi that adds to Hyland's equities in this litigation?"19 In the
light of the reasoning expounded in the American Bonding & Trust case,20 it would
seem that the result would favor the supplier; however, the Franchi court, analyzing
11. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Dakota Elec. Supply
Co., 309 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 936 (1963); United States ex rel. Carroll
v. Beck, supra note 7; United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Johnson, Smathers & Rollins, supra
note 6.
12. Supra note 8.
13. Id. at 931.
14. Ibid.
15. 112 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 700 (1940).
16. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Dakota Elec. Supply Co., supra
note 11, at 29.
17. Cases cited supra note 11. In the St. Paul Fire &" Marine Ins. Co. case, supra note 11,
the court held it was not necessary for the creditor-supplier to have actual knowledge of
the source of the payment so long as the creditor had reason to know where the debtor ac-
quired his funds.
18. In Delaware Dredging Co. v. Tucker Stevedoring Co., 25 F.2d 44 (3rd Cir. 1928), the
court held that, in the absence of instructions from the debtor, the payment should be
applied to the oldest account, whether it be secured or not. United States ex rel. Carroll v.
Beck, supra note 7, at 966, and R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., supra note 15,
at 153 n.l, distinguished the Delaware Dredging Co. case by noting that there was no dis-
cussion concerning the creditor's knowledge of the source of the funds.
19. United States ex rel. Hyland Elec. Supply Co. v. Franchi Bros. Constr. Corp., supra
note 2, at 138.
20. United States v. American Bonding & Trust Co., supra note 8.
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this issue in terms of equitable estoppel, found no prejudicial reliance as a result of
the prime contractor's silence regarding the application of payments, and concluded
that the supplier was still bound by the equitable duty set forth in the prior case law.
The court did not discuss whether, under these circumstances, the silence and ap-
parent acquiesence of Franchi, the prime contractor, may have given Hyland, the
creditor-supplier, reason to believe that Fairway, the debtor-subcontractor, was free
to apply the payments as it determined and under no duty to Franchi to discharge a
particular debt. This would seem important, since it is knowledge of the debtor's
duty which brings into effect the special rule restricting freedom of application be-
tween debtor and creditor. The decision for the supplier in Koehring Co. v. United
States ex rel. Hoover Equipment Co.2 1 was based upon reasoning limited to the pecu-
liar circumstances of that case.
Franchi represents an extension of the case law protection given to the prime con-
tractor when his payments are applied to other debts of the subcontractor. But the
prime contractor is not without means to protect himself. He could require the sub-
contractor to furnish a payment bond or some other security.22 He could request the
subcontractor to present receipted bills from the supplier to insure that payment for
the labor or materials was actually made. Where the prime contractor has notice, as
here, he might reasonably be expected to take certain precautions before sending
a second payment to the subcontractor.23 This argument, however, was advanced
and rejected.24 The result is that the creditor-supplier is confronted on the one hand
with the instructions of his debtor, and on the other by the equitable duty imposed
by the federal courts.
The cases here discussed must be considered in the context of the legislation re-
quiring the payment bond, i.e., the Miller Act or its predecessor, the Heard Act.25
These acts were not designed to protect general contractors.26 The Congressional in-
tent and purpose of the legislation has been judicially declared to be the payment
in full to, and the protection of, those whose labor or materials go into public proj-
ects. 27 Since laborers and materialmen cannot levy upon government buildings or
21. 303 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1962).
22. See United States ex rel. Lincoln Elec. Prod. Co. v. Greene Elec. Serv., Inc., 252 F. Supp.
324 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
23. The Miller Act requires a laborer or materialman having a contractual relationship
with the subcontractor to give the prime contractor written notice of the subcontractor's
default within ninety days in order to sue on the bond. See Miller Act § 2, ch. 642, 49 Stat.
794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1964). The purpose of such notice to the prime contractor
is to enable him to protect himself against his subcontractor by withholding from him the
money due on his subcontract. See McWaters & Bartlett v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 272
F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1959). In Franchi the prime contractor received notice of his subcontrac-
tor's actions separate from the notice required by statute to sue upon the bond, yet the prime
contractor did nothing to protect himself.
24. Consolidated Elec. Co. v. United States ex rel. Gough Indus., Inc., 355 F.2d 437 (9th
Cir. 1966).
25. Heard Act, ch. 280,28 Stat. 278 (1894), as amended, ch. 778, 33 Stat. 811 (1905), repealed
by Miller Act § 5, ch. 642, 49 Stat. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270 (a)-(d) (1964).
26. See, e.g., St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Jones, 238 F.2d 917, 921
(10th Cir. 1956); United States ex rel. Tom P. McDermott, Inc. v. Woods Constr. Co., 224 F.
Supp. 406, 409 (N.D. Okla. 1963).
27. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miller & Bentley Equip. Co. v. Kelley, 327 F.2d 590 (9th
Cir. 1964); Liebman v. United States ex rel. California Elec. Supply Co., 153 F.2d 350 (9th
Cir. 1946); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. McNulty Bros., 13 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1926). See also
Burgess, A Commentary on the Miller Act, 42 B.U.L. REv. 282 (1962).
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facilities, the payment bond furnished under the statute is their sole security, in lieu
of a mechanic's or materialman's lien which the supplier would have in private con-
struction.
In the light of this judicial interpretation of the Miller Act, Franchi afforded the
court an opportunity to relax the equitable obligation by which it had bound the
creditor-supplier in the past. The court, however, rejected this opportunity. Inherent
in the analysis of prior decisions was a camouflaged element of fraud. The conduct
of the creditor-supplier and debtor-subcontractor, out of sight and to the detriment
of the prime contractor, could hardly be sanctioned judicially. In such a situation,
the courts have evidently felt that between the prime contractor and the sup-
plier, the supplier should bear the loss occasioned by a subcontractor's subsequent
insolvency or refusal to pay. In Franchi, however, it appears that the supplier did all
he could under the circumstances by requesting that the two checks be sent directly
to him, and by giving notice to the prime contractor that the checks were being ap-
plied by the subcontractor in satisfaction of a preexisting debt. No fraud could be
suggested on the part of the supplier. The prime contractor, on the other hand, was
not the innocent third party whom the courts have protected in prior cases. Here,
the supplier exercised due care. The diligence of the prime contractor, who sent a
second payment after receiving such notice, is questionable. In view of these facts,
and considering the status of the parties, the decision is inequitable.
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